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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICIA J. SMUIN,

*
•

Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant,

*
*

Case No.

900483-CA

•

vs.

*

FLOYD R. SMUIN,

*
•

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

*
*

Argument Priority
Classification No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(h).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final judgment entered by
the Honorable Judge Dennis L. Draney, Eighth Judicial
District Court, relative to a divorce proceeding entered
August 22, 1990.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.

Did the court correctly compute Plaintiff's alimony

when it took into consideration that both parties worked and
contributed to their life style, that Defendant has a
substantial net income while

Plaintiff is unable to work

and her net income from disability payment is minimal in
comparison.
2.

Did the court properly award permanent alimony to

Plaintiff since there were no facts adduced at trial
indicating any likelihood that Plaintiff, given her age and
disabilities, has any potential to increase her income in
the future.
3.

Did the trial court properly award health insurance

to the Plaintiff in view of her severe and permanent
disability and in view of the availability of insurance
through Defendant's employment.
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

awarding the full amount of Defendant's retirement plan
funds to Defendant in exchange for payment of one half of
the marital debt of the parties without verifying the value
of Defendant's retirement funds and without entering a
2

qualified domestic relations order, when facts indicated
that Defendant's retirement funds and property might triple
the amount of the marital debt and accrued in large part
during the marriage of the parties.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
29 U.S.C.A. §1056(d) (West Supp. 1991)

19

26 U.S.C.A. §414(p) (West Supp. 1991)

16

26 U.S.C.A. &4980B (West Supp. 1991)

16

Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended). 1

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
On November 24, 1989, Plaintiff-Appellee and CrossAppellant Patricia Smuin (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a
Complaint for Divorce claiming irreconcilable differences
between the parties.

Plaintiff requested among other things

alimony; release from liability for the marital debts of the
parties; medical and dental health insurance as available
through the employment of Defendant-Appellant and CrossAppellee Floyd R. Smuin (hereinafter Defendant); and a
qualified domestic relations order to facilitate an award to
Plaintiff of one half of Defendant's retirement and profitsharing plans.

(R. 1)
Course of the Proceedings

Following a bench trial on May 30, 1991, Honorable
Dennis L. Draney of the Eighth Judicial District Court
granted Plaintiff a divorce.

On June 11, 1990, Defendant

filed an Objection to the Court's Decision which was not
designated as a Motion under Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b) or
59.

On August 10, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Response to

Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision.

On August 27,

1990, Defendant filed a Request for Ruling on his Objection
to Court's Decision.

4

On August 22, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce were signed and entered by the
trial court.

On August 23, 1990, the Court entered a Ruling

on Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision.
On September 5, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Verified
Petition for Order to Show Cause for enforcement of the
court's decr€*e because Defendant had not paid any alimony or
insurance premiums, had threatened Plaintiff, and had not
allowed Plaintiff to collect her personal belongings as
previously agreed.

On September 25, 1990, a hearing was

held on the Order to Show Cause theretofore issued and the
court entered its ruling for immediate enforcement of the
decree.

On September 28, 1990, a Notice of Appeal was filed

by Defendant.

On September 19, 1990, Plaintiff filed a

Notice of Cross-Appeal.
Disposition in the Court Below
Pursuant to the decree of August 22, 1990, the court
granted Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $400.00 per month
to be paid by Defendant.

The court chose not to limit this

alimony to a definite period.

(R. 48). The court further

decreed that Defendant should pay approximately $130.00 per
month (Tr. 99 L. 3-11) for the extended benefits of
Defendant's health insurance coverage through his employment
5

covering his wife under the COBRA provisions.

The marital

debts of approximately $36,000.00 were to be paid by
Defendant in exchange for which the Defendant was to obtain
any and all interest he might have in the profit-sharing and
retirement plans held through his employer.

(R. 48).

Plaintiff was awarded the 1975 Buick free and clear,
while Defendant was awarded the 1973 trailer free and clear.
The court also ordered that Defendant keep the 1987 Cadillac
together with the indebtedness of $12,000.00 thereon. The
contemporary award of personal property was confirmed. (R.
48).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time that the parties were married on August 6,
1975, (Tr. 16 L. 19), Plaintiff had one fifteen year old son
living with her from a previous marriage, and the recently
widowed Defendant had his three children living with him.
(Tr. 17 L. 15-25), Tr. 18 L. 1-12).

Plaintiff took

temporary leave from her full-time employment to help with
the children and the home.

(Tr. 19 L. 2-16, Tr. 40 L. 11-

25) .
In 1981, increasing problems between the parties and
with the children compelled the Plaintiff to move out of the
home.

(Tr 26 L. 20-25, Tr. 39 L. 16-19).
6

Plaintiff lived

apart in a trailer that she purchased through her employment
and continued to support herself and her son.
13).

(Tr. 27 L. 1-

The parties achieved at least partial reconciliation

and continued their marital relationship, still holding
themselves out to the community as husband and wife: they
consistently dined, vacationed and weekended together; they
named each other as beneficiaries in health and life
insurance policies; they owned checking accounts and
vehicles jointly; and they had physical marital
relationships.

(Tr. 28 - Tr. 35 L. 1), (Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr.

90 L. 15).
In 1983, the parties entered into a children's clothing
store business together.

(Tr. 34 - Tr. 35 L. 1). The

Plaintiff agreed albeit reluctantly that she would take on
the management of the store.

Defendant agreed to use part

of the equity on the home that he owned prior to the
marriage of the parties to finance the venture.

(Tr. 35 L.

21 - Tr. 36 L. 7). When the business failed within a year.
Defendant blamed Plaintiff, even though business was
depressed all over Uintah County because of the general
recession and the collapse of oil-shale enterprises.
83 L. 16 - Tr. 34 L. 1).
Subsequent to the failure of their business, the
7

(Tr.

parties continued in their separate employments and separate
homes until May 15, 1988, when Plaintiff moved back with the
Defendant.

On June 27, 1988, she suffered from a brain

aneurysm and was hospitalized.

(Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44 L. 5

- L. 26). Plaintiff has been completely disabled since
then. (Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3)On February 16, 1989, Plaintiff had surgery on her
remaining aneurysms and was cautioned to avoid all even
slight trauma to the head.

Defendant also was cautioned.

(Tr. 45 L. 8 - Tr. 46 L. 8). On July 3, 1989, Plaintiff
suffered additional damage, including double vision,
confused thinking, lack of bladder control, and body
numbness, consequent to a bump on her head.

Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant intentionally caused the bump.
(Tr. 69 L. 7 - L. 18, Tr. 45 L. 11 - Tr. 48 L. 18).
After this further deterioration in Plaintiff's
condition and at Defendant's insistence, Plaintiff filed for
divorce in November of 1989.

Defendant took Plaintiff to

file pro se in order to save money.

(Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62

L. 19).
Plaintiff presently receives $427.00 monthly in Social
Security Disability income.

(Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3).

Defendant's Financial Statement of April, 1990, indicates a
8

gross income of $3,725.00 monthly. Testimony adduced at
trial showed that upon retirement Defendant will receive at
least $1,079.33 per month from Chevron and $268.33 from
Stauffer's. (Tr. 87 L. 10 - 17). Additionally, a fully
vested annuity fund from Defendant's present employer exists
which was not discussed at trial, with a deferred value of
$334.00 as calculated in April of 1983.
Exhibit 8).

(Defendant's

Furthermore, all funds available to Defendant

upon retirement through Social Security which would accrue
in addition to the above sums were not mentioned by counsel
or by the court.
Preliminary calculations as presented at trial revealed
the value of Defendant's retirement fund as approximately
between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. Debt of the marriage,
including the approximate $12,000.00 owed on the 1987 El
Dorado Cadillac, totalled approximately $47,000.00.
(Tr. 82

L. 1 - L. 16, Defendant's Exhibits 1 - 2 ) .

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Awarding Plaintiff $400.00 in monthly alimony payments
unlimited by any definite period was properly within the
trial court's discretion and was an equitable determination
given the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Similarly, the award of health insurance to Plaintiff should
be confirmed.

A trial court has considerable discretion in

adjusting financial and property interests of parties, and
the Court of Appeals will not disturb the lower court's
decision unless it is clearly an abuse of discretion.
The lower court's decision allowing Defendant the right
to all the proceeds from his retirement and profit-sharing
funds in exchange for Defendant's responsibility for the
full mortgage debt should be remanded so that a qualified
domestic relations order be entered and a proper
determination be made of the amount of money represented by
one half of Defendant's retirement benefits earned during
the course of the marriage.

10

ARGUMENT

I. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN COMPUTING PLAINTIFF'S
PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD.
A. The Lower Court correctly computed alimony when it
took into account among other things the parties' relative
incomes and the disability of the Plaintiff.
It is settled in Utah that a divorce court has
considerable discretion in adjusting financial and property
interests of the parties, and that the Court of Appeals will
not disturb a Court's decision unless it is clearly unjust
or a clear abuse of discretion.

Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d

1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988); Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780
(Utah 1986); Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978).
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider
three factors: (1) the financial condition and need of the
receiving spouse; (2), the ability of the receiving spouse
to produce sufficient income for him or herself; (3) the
ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
The lower court calculated Plaintiff's alimony award
equitably taking into consideration the relative incomes of
the parties and the future earning potential of the
11

Defendant as well as the lack of earning potential of the
Plaintiff. (R. 4). Plaintiff's gross and net monthly income
is $427.00 from Social Security disability income.

(Tr. 51

L. 23). From this Plaintiff must pay rent and other monthly
expenses including medical prescriptions totaling $892.75.
(Tr. 58 L. 23).
Defendant's gross monthly income is $3,725.00 with a
net income of $2,620.38

(Defendant's Financial Statement).

Defendant's calculations for monthly expenses of $1,860.43
include the full debt assigned to him by the court, part of
which is a payment in lieu of rent for the equity of his
home in the amount of $476.55, and part of which is the debt
on the 1987 Cadillac bought by and awarded to him. (Tr. 91
L. 3-21, Defendant's Exhibit 1, Tr. 81

L. 1-19).

Due to Plaintiff's total and permanent disability as
adjudged by the Social Security Administration, (R. 49 L. 15), it is not likely that she will be able to increase her
present income in the future.

If Plaintiff were to increase

her income substantially, the lower court's decision would
not prevent an appropriate modification at that time.
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123.

12

B. The court properly considered the standard of
living/ the quality and the length of the marriage to arrive
at an equitable result.
The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the
party receiving alimony will be able to support him or
herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.

Schindler, 77 6 P.2d at 90.

Testimony adduced at trial confirms that the alimony
award allows Plaintiff merely to subsist at minimum levels
and not to enjoy the pre-divorce standard of living.

In

contrast, Defendant will continue to enjoy his pre-divorce
life, and probably will continue to improve it.

(R. 63 L.

24 - R. 65 L. 20). Thus the alimony award represents a
minimum amount due the Plaintiff and is by no means
inequitable to the Defendant.
Contribution to the health and quality of the marriage
as well as circumstances of the parties upon divorce
constitute legitimate considerations of the trial court in
its arrival at an equitable alimony award.

Burt v. Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In his brief, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's
alleged lack of contribution to the marriage renders the
alimony award inequitable.

Defendant even mentions that he

made a few payments on Plaintiff's car that she brought into
13

the marriage, an allegation first offered in his brief,
totally unsupported by the record, and intended to bolster
his premise that since Plaintiff contributed nothing to the
marriage it would be inequitable to award her alimony.
(Brief of Appellant at 5, but see Tr. 20 L. 9-11, Tr. 2325) .
However, the facts adduced at trial reveal Plaintiff's
considerable contributions to the

marriage.

Plaintiff

contributed economically: through employment, through labor
and skill in management of the business venture entered into
by the parties, through inheritance invested in the expenses
of the marriage, and through extensive personal property
brought into the marriage. (Tr. 20 - Tr. 26, Tr. 96 L. 1323).
Plaintiff also contributed emotionally and socially to
the relationship, first by taking responsibility for
Defendant's home and children, including their medical and
educational needs.

(Tr. 26, Tr. 39 L. 3 - Tr. 40 L. 25).

Later, Plaintiff continued to contribute to the marriage by
living and supporting herself and her son separately, thus
relieving some of the tensions in the household: the parties
still spent most of their time together, dining, weekending,
vacationing, and sustaining marital relationships together.
14

(Tr. 28-35 L. 1,

Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr. 90 L. 15).

Defendant also claims that the years when the parties
were not living together should not be "counted" as part of
their marriage. (Brief of Appellant at 12-13).

His further

assertion that he "took Plaintiff back" after her aneurysms
attacks (Brief of Appellant at 11-12) is patently false and
unsupported by the record, as she returned to live with him
approximately one month before her first attack, and was
forced into divorce soon thereafter.

(Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44

L. 5 - L. 26, Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62 L. 19).
In any event, the trial court has wide discretion to
evaluate the marital estate as of the date of the
termination of the marriage, even if the parties have been
separated.
1987).

Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah

Additionally, the trial court has discretion even to

take into consideration the premarital assets of a party
under appropriate

circumstances to achieve an equitable

alimony and property settlement award.

Noble v. Noble, 761

P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988).
In the present case, the trial court's computation of
alimony and its permanent assignment are equitably tailored
to both parties' circumstances.
alimony award should be affirmed.
15

Therefore the trial court's

II. THE COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS
TO PLAINTIFF ASIDE AND APART FROM ALIMONY.
It has been argued above that the alimony award
represents a minimum equitable award for Plaintiff, given
her total inability to meet basic expenses without said
award and given the ability of the Defendant to provide said
award.
The alimony award meets this minimum standard only
because of the additional award of health insurance which
enables Plaintiff to sustain her medical treatments without
sinking to the abject poverty required for total Medicaid
coverage. (Tr.

6 5 L . 2 1 - T r . 6 5 L . 5). COBRA provisions

in federal law facilitate continuing coverage for Plaintiff
under Defendant's group policy, with Defendant remaining
responsible for only 50% of the premium.

See 26 U.S.C.A.

4980B (West Supp. 1991).
The premium required to be paid by the Defendant was
approximately $130.00 per month at the time of trial. (Tr.
99 L. 3-8). Any additional premium amount would be
accompanied by Defendant's corresponding cost of living
raise.
The trial court decided correctly that health benefits
of all awards are essential to avoid Plaintiff's complete
poverty and dependence on the state.
16

Therefore Plaintiff's

health benefit award should be affirmed.

III. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT ALL THE
RETIREMENT AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS COMPENSATION FOR
DEFENDANT RETAINING RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY THE MORTGAGE DEBT
OF THE PARTIES.
A. The court failed to perform the required accounting
of sums available to Defendant through retirement and
employment benefits earned during the course of the marriage
of the parties.
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court required the trial court to consider the
value of the husband's retirement and employment accounts
and to reapportion property distribution to offset the
resulting values.

The Gardner court stated that valuation

of such accounts "should be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached."

Id.

P.2d 431, 432

at 1078. See also Woodward v. Woodward, 656
(Utah 1982); and see, Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576

P.2d 1274, 1276 (1978) .
In the instant case, the court below failed to
determine the value of Defendant's retirement earned during
the course of the marriage as required by Gardner.

It was

only "estimated" at trial that Defendant's retirement funds
were valued at between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. No
17

findings were made as to the present value of the vested and
unvested stock options of Defendant. Similarly, no findings
as to the vested and unvested annuity or as to the Social
Security income to be available to Defendant were made.
Normally, Plaintiff should have been awarded a value
represented by retirement benefits times one half of the
fraction represented by the years of the marriage over the
years that Defendant earned the benefits.

See Woodward, 656

P.2d at 433-34.
The lower court determined it an equitable division of
responsibilities and rights to hold Defendant fully and not
one half liable for the mortgage debt but to allow Defendant
any and all proceeds from his retirement accounts earned
during the marriage.
Thus Plaintiff gives up all interest in accounts
probably in excess of $100,000.00 in exchange for relief
from one half of a $36,000.00 mortgage debt. (Defendant's
Exhibit 15, 3-4). The lower court failed consider the result
and to determine the monetary values in a "sufficiently
detailed"

manner as required by Gardner.

Therefore the

present case should be remanded for the appropriate
calculations, and for the requisite reapportionment of
property interests in Defendant's retirement accounts.
18

B. The* trial court did not enter a qualified domestic
order as requested by the Plaintiff and as proper under the
facts of this case.
29 U.S.C. §1056 et seq. outlines the procedure by which
a domestic relations order may qualify a former spouse as
alternate payee to certain of the accrued benefits before or
upon the payee's retirement.

See also,, 26 U.S.C. §414(p).

In her Complaint, Plaintiff requested that the court below
enter a qualified domestic relations order for appropriate
benefits in order to assure herself of a secure and
dependable source of income in light of her severe and
permanent mental and physical disabilities.
Defendant has demonstrated his unwillingness to provide
for Plaintiff in her disabled condition.

The marriage

survived as long as Plaintiff fully provided for herself
financially while continuing to sustain the marriage
emotionally and socially.

In the latter years of the

marriage, Plaintiff even bought her own trailer and lived
separately so as to relieve tensions with stepchildren and
so as to avoid violent confrontations with the Defendant.
(Tr. 25).
When the stepchildren problems began to diminish upon
their gradual emancipation, Plaintiff again attempted to
live with Defendant; but soon after her cataclysmic brain
19

damage, Defendant took her to file for divorce pro se to
avoid expense.

Defendant could not deal with being on the

giving end of the relationship even during her period of
disability.

See supra at 7.

Since the divorce, Plaintiff has had to return to court
on an Order to Show Cause because Defendant did not pay
court ordered alimony and health insurance premiums. See
supra at 5.
Thus a qualified domestic relations order would aid
Plaintiff by making her a direct payee of benefits to which
she is entitled.

She would not have to depend upon

Defendant totally in order to receive necessary funds.
Therefore the case should be remanded for a proper
determination of those benefits whether vested or not vested
which are appropriately distributed through a qualified
domestic relations order.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons outlined above, the trial court's
awards of alimony and health insurance should be affirmed.
The case should be remanded for the limited purpose of
valuation and distribution of property, with provision for
entering a qualified domestic relations order if appropriate
under the facts adduced on remand.
20

DATED t h i s
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JVLt/^^
day of __<-£

1991

Respectfull r y~ N submitted,

UTAH^EGAL "SERVICES, Inc .
By Jferri .Hill
Attorney/for Appellant-Cross-Appellee

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Jerri Hill, attorney tor Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
hereby certify that on the \ y day of J^./-*—^ 1991, I
mailed four true and correct copies of the above Brief of
Appellant-Cross-Appellee, first class postage prepaid, to:
ROBERT M. McCRAE, Attorney at Law
McCRAE & DeLAND
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
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Utah 221

ALEXANDER v. A L E X A W D E R
Qte«s737 T2d 221 (Utah 1987)

any work stoppage caused by a strike deprives the workers of benefits. When the
employer violates the labor laws, the state
will subsidize the subsequent strike, even
though the strike stops all work.
The employees argue that they qualify
for this exception because the strike was
caused by Greyhound's violation of federal
labor laws. The employees cite a variety
of company activities which they believe
are unfair labor practices under section 8(a)
of the National Labor Relations Act,^including threats of loss of employment or
benefits, picket line surveillance, and circumvention of the collective bargaining
agreement.
[7] Greyhound disputes this claim in
three ways. It first argues that the unfair
labor provisions relied on by claimants are
not laws "pertaining to hours, wages, or
other conditions of work," as those terms
are used in section 35-4-5(dXl) of the Code,
and that those are the only violations that
can trigger the operation of that section.
Second, Greyhound contends that even if%
claimants' alleged violations do fall within
section 35-4-5(dXl), the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive and preemptive
jurisdiction to decide whether an employer
has committed an unfair labor practice under federal law. Lastly, Greyhound argues
that it did not, in fact, commit the alleged
unfair labor practices. We find that the
alleged violations do not relate to "hours,
wages, or other conditions of work"; therefore, we need not reach Greyhound's second and third contentions.
[8] Most of Greyhound's alleged labor
law violations pertain to the bargaining
process. Only the alleged imposition of
Greyhound's October 31st offer with a retroactivity provision could be said to directr
ly affect wages, hours, or conditions of
work. The employer's implementation of
its proposals after negotiations have
reached an impasse, however, is not prohibi t Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 15S(a) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer—

ited by law. ATnerican Federation of
Television & Radio Artists v. N.L.R.B.,
395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C.Cir.1968). We
therefore conclude that section 35~4-5(dXl)
has not been triggered here.
In this case, Greyhound suffered a work
stoppage that existed because of a strike.
The strike was not a result of Greyhound's
nonconformance with the law, but was a
voluntary action taken by the employees in
the course of negotiating a new contract.
The decision of the Board is therefore affirmed.
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate
CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
rwHY HUMKI SttTIM
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Stephen Noma ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,
Diane Jean ALEXANDER, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 20841.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 28, 1987.
Decree of divorce was entered in the
District Court, Second Judicial District,
Douylas L. Cornaby, J., and husband app e a l e d T h e Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that (1) awarding custody of youngest child to wife, thereby separating youngest child from three older siblings, who
lived with husband, was not abuse of trial
court's discretion; (2) refusal to reduce val(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this ^tle;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title.

*

, 01 nusDand s profit-sharing plan to account for income tax liability that could be

imposed in future was not abuse of trial
court's discretion; and (3) including in evaluation of marital estate contributions husband made to profit-sharing plan after wife
left marital home but before marriage was
terminated was not abuse of trial court's
discretion.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion.

1. Divorce «=»301
Task of determining best interest of
child in custody dispute was for trial judge,
who had opportunity to personally observe
and evaluate witnesses.
2. Infants «=>19.3(7)
Custody determination of trial judge
will not be overruled where trial judge
exercised his discretion in accord with standards set by Supreme Court
3. Divorce <*=>301
Evidence that wife had been primary
care-giver for youngest child and planned
to live with child's grandmother in situation
in which grandmother would share childcare duties and evidence suggesting that
husband ran a dirty, disorganized household and had no firm plans for care of child
while he worked were sufficient to support
award of custody of youngest child to wife.
4. Divorce <*=>298(4)
Fact that wife had abandoned husband
did not preclude trial court from awarding
custody of youngest child to wife in divorce
action. U.C.A.1953, 30-2-10.
15. Divorce «=>296
Awarding custody of youngest child to
wife, thereby separating youngest child
from three older siblings, who lived with
husband, was not abuse of trial court's
discretion in divorce action; there was ten
and one-half-year gap between parties' last
two children, wife was primary care-giver
for youngest child and there was evidence
that husband was unable to provide home
environment suitable for youngest child.

<J. Parent and Child *=*2(3)
Maternal preference is impermissible
in custody proceeding.
7. Divorce «=>298(1)
Isolated statement by trial judge, to
effect that wife lost custody of three older
children when she left marital home, was
insufficient to show that award of custody
of youngest child to wife was based on
improper maternal preference.
8. Divorce «=»252.4
Property division which required husband to pay marital debts was not abuse of
trial court's discretion in divorcfc-actian.
9. Divorce <3=>253(3)
Trial court's refusal to reduce present
value of husband's profit-sharing plan "to
account for income tax liability that could
bejmposed in the future was not abuse of
trial court's discretion in determiningproperty division in divorce action.
10. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
Including contribution husband made
to^Trofit-sharing plan after wife left marital home but before marriage was terminated was not abuse of trial court's discretion in valuing marital estate in divorce
action.
William H. Lindsley, for plaintiff and appellant
James B. Hanks, for defendant and respondent
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiff Stephen Norris Alexander appeals from a decree of divorce awarding
defendant Diane Jean Alexander custody
of their youngest child.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in
Arizona in 1968. At the time of the marriage, defendant was sixteen years old and
pregnant. The parties had two more children within the first three and a half years
of their marriage, making defendant the
mother of three preschoolers at the age of
nineteen. After a ten and a half-year hiatus, the parties' fourth and final child was
born.
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[5] Plaintiffs claim that it was improper to separate the children is likewise without merit "While it is true that a child
custody award which keeps all the children
of the marriage united is generally preferred to one which divides them between
the parents, that preference is not binding
on the face of considerations dictating a
contrary course of action." Jorgensen v.
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1979);
see also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120
(Utah 1986). In this case, we think the ten
and a half-year gap between the parties'
last two children, defendant's role as primary care-giver, and plaintiffs inability to
provide a home environment suitable for a
young child are considerations that were
properly used to award defendant custody
of the youngest child. We find no abuse of
discretion.
[6,7] Plaintiff also asserts that the trial
court was motivated by an improper preference for the mother because of the age of
the youngest child. We agree with plaintiff that a maternal preference is impermissible. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah
1986). Plaintiff, however, has offered us
no proof that such a preference operated
here. As support for his claim, he cites
only an isolated statement by the trial
judge to the effect that defendant lost custody of the three older children when she
left the marital home. Plaintiff asks us to
reach too far to move from this remark to
the conclusion that the trial court exercised
an improper maternal preference.
Property Division
The trial court awarded defendant, who
has only a tenth-grade education, no alimony, but gave her half of the marital estate
and ordered plaintiff to pay the couple's
outstanding debts in lieu of alimony. Neither party was awarded child support
Plaintiff claims that it was error for the
trial court to order him to pay the marital]
debts and argues that the trial court erred
in failing to reduce the value of a stockprice-tied profit-sharing plan to account for
tax liability and in including post-separation contributions to the plan in assessing
its value. We find no error.

[8] As long as a property division is
made within the standards set by this
Court, we will not disturb the trial judge's
decision. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074;
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782
(Utah 1986). We find the property division
made by the trial court to be well within its
discretion.
This Court endows the court's adjustment of the financial interests of the
parties with a presumption of validity
and does not review their values absent a
clear abuse of discretion — We do not
lightly disturb property divisions made
by the trial court and uphold its decision
except where to do so would work a
manifest injustice or inequity.
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119 (citations
omitted); see Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d
1201 (Utah 1983).
[9,10] We also decline to disturb the
trial court's valuation of the profit-sharing
plan. The trial court did not reduce the
present value of the plan to account for
income tax liability that could be imposed
in the future. Plaintiff has not argued and
it does not appear that the valuation of the
profit-sharing plan was itself a taxable
event; therefore, we do not think the trial
court's refusal to speculate about hypothetical future consequences was an abuse of
discretion. See Gilbert v. Gilbert,.G2& P.2d
1088, 1089 (Montl981) (affirming a property division in which the trial judge did not
adjust the market value of a retirement
account in anticipation of future tax liabili/t^j~Plaintiff argues that contributions he
'made to the profit-sharing plan after defendant left the marital home but before
the marriage was terminated i
Tiiave been included in the maKt%l estate^
We disagree. Under appropriate cifeszn^
sjances. the trial court is wiffiihHfe^dis^nr"
tion in evaluating the marital estate as of
thgjlate the marriage is terminated. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328
(Utah 1980).
Affirmed. Costs to respondent
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate
CJ., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
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a somewhat similar instruction was harmless error. Furthermore, the property stolen was not fungible property which defendant might have legitimately possessed.
Rather, the checks were identified as property belonging to others were shown to
have been forged and would not legitimately have been in his possession under any
circumstances.
Affirmed.
HALL, CJ., concurs.
DURHAM, Justice (concurring
separately):
I concur in the majority opinion, but
write separately to emphasize the obligation of defense counsel to notify judges
who have ruled on pretrial suppression issues that defendants' objections to challenged evidence are reserved and not withdrawn, thus alerting those judges to the
possibility that trial evidence may affect
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that
in this case there was an extensive hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is
quite clear from the record that defense
counsel did not intend to waive any related
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, several ambiguous references during trial to a
"prior motion" may have referred to defendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is
important, however, that trial judges be
given the opportunity to review pretrial
suppression rulings when and if there is
any likelihood that they were erroneous.
When the pretrial judge is also the trial
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is
easily accomplished by indicating on the
record, either at the end of the pretrial
hearing or at the trial outside the presence
of the jury, that there is a continuing objection to the evidence challenged in the motion to suppress.
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f
concur in the concurring opinion of
DURHAM, J.

Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
William James GARDNER, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 19246.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 4, 1988.

Divorce decree was entered by the Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate CJ., held
that (1) trial court was required to value
husband's retirement account; (2) wife was
entitled to findings in support of denial of
her request for portion of husband's medical assets; (3) regardless of whether evaluation and distribution of a professional degree or professional practice is ever appropriate, it was inappropriate in the present
case where marriage was of long duration
and present earnings and business assets
provided a more accurate measure of the
true worth of wife's investment in husband's degree; and (4) alimony award was
insufficient and inequitable.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and
dissenting.

1. Divorce *=»286(5)
Though the Supreme Court may modify decisions of trial court, trial^ourt^JP*
portionment of marital property will^gl^
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust^gLl
clear abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce «=»252.3(4)
Marital property includes pension fund
or insurance, but dividing retirement or
pension funds is not necessarily consisten
with principles of equitable distribution*
all cases, and providing for payments w
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payout begins should be employed only m
rare instances.

would qualify for social security payments
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years."

3. Divorce <3=>252.3(4)
* Trial court, in apportioning marital
property upon divorce, was required to at
least consider the value of the husband's
retirement account, and alternatives available for taking that value into account
would include requiring husband to pay
half of net present value to wife in annual
jnstallmentsJ or reapportioning property
distribution to offset that value.

9. Divorce <3=*225
There was no error in divorce case in
failing to award attorney fees to wife,
where portion of property award was for
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney
and no showing was made in trial as to the
nature and amount of fees.

£!

-

•

Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellant
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant
and respondent.

4.-Divorce <3=*253(4)
p& Wife was entitled to finding in support
ofctienial of her request for a portion of the
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
assets of husband's medical assets, and it
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a
was error to refuse to place present value
fijereon on the ground that the assets were decree awarding alimony and attorney fees
in a divorce action she brought against her
futuristic."
former husband, William Gardner. We re5? Divorce <s=>252.3(l)
verse and remand for further consideraGoodwill is properly subject to eq- tion.
uitable distribution upon divorce.
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at
6. Divorce e=»252.3(l)
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950.
Regardless of whether professional de- No children were born to them, but the
gree and professional practice may in ap- couple adopted two children who are now
propriate cases constitute marital property both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs.
subject to evaluation and distribution upon Gardner worked full-time as a secretary
^ivorce, wife's request for property inter- while Mr. Gardner completed his medical
est in husband's medical degree was inap- training. Mr. Gardner also worked various
propriate where the marriage was of long jobs, and his parents provided support in
juration and present earnings and business the form of medical school tuition. Mrs.
assets provided a more accurate measure Gardner has not worked since 1958, when
[ofjhe true worth of the wife's investment Mr. Gardner completed his medical training. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a
m^her husband's degree.
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month.
7." Divorce «=>237
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner
^Alimony award should, after marriage
acquired substantial real and personal
^Tlong duration and to the extent possible7
property. Their major asset was a farm,
Equalize the parties' respective standards
including a home and equipment located
Lo^lmng and maintain them at a level as
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000
[dose ^Tbossible to the standard of living
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr.
fajoyed during the marriage.
Gardner's medical assets and retirement
Wvorce *»240(2)
funds with an uncertain valuation of be_ "Alimony award of $1,200 per month tween $73,000 and $177.000; a contract for
feffl husband's retirement and $600 per the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Investr
l&guth thereafter was an abuse of discre- ment Company; a certificate of deposit;
Jgg^where husband was a physician with household furniture, furnishings and fixSJgjagB of $6,000 per month, wife had not tures; boats and automobiles; sporting
^employed for 30 years, husband had equipment; and two horses and associated
lt
antial retirement assets, and wife equipment At the time of divorce, the
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couple's only outstanding debts were a
first mortgage on the family home and a
loan for the purchase of one automobile.
The trial court ordered that the farm,
home, and equipment be sold and the proceeds be divided equally. Until the farm
was sold; Mrs. Gardner was entitled to its
use, although she had to pay the mortgage,
taxes, and insurance. The court also ordered that the motor vehicles and boats be
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with
the exception of one personal automobile
for each party. The household furnishings
and other items of personal property were
divided roughly equally, according to personal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his
medical and business assets, including retirement funds, except MRS. Gardner was
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay
her attorney fees. They were to share
equally a money market certificate. The
court granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 per
month aiimony, to be reduced to $600 per
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement.
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for,
$50,000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the
event that he predeceased her.
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse
the judgment of the lower court She cites
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she
has a spousal right to an equitable distribution of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds.
She also asserts a property interest in his
medical degree and business and claims
that the alimony award was insufficient.
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of
attorney fees.
In a divorce proceeding, the trial
court should make a distribution of property and income so that the parties may
readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well as possible. Turner v.
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may
modify decisions of the trial court, its apportionment of marital property will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a
clear abuse of discretion. Turner, 649
P.2d at 8.

The trial court awarded Mr. Gardner his
retirement account and medical assets
without placing a present value on any of
those assets. The trial court called both
those types of assets "futuristic" and indicated that their value would be utilized at
retirement. The court did not attempt to
resolve the differing valuations of the assets and provided little explanation for the
award to Mr. Gardner.
Recently, in Acton v. Dehran, 737 P 2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted:
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issueslTreversihfa
error unless the facts in the record arq
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable Qf
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment'' Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). ... The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree "follows logically
from, and is supported by, the evidence."
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah
1986). The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v.
Dalton], 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981).
The trial court's statement in its findings
that the retirement account and Mr. Gardner's medical assets are "futuristic" was
apparently intended to mean that they
could not be given a present value or
should not for other reasons be taken into
account. That, however, does not follow
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is
it supported by our cases. Regardless of
how remote the full value of an assetj^jL
still has pi^ser£value. The testimony adduced at trial devoted to differing valuations by the parties merited more precise
findings.
( f ^ In Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d at 432, wejrecognized that retirement
benefits, whether vested or not, arejjorg.
of deferred compensation wtachj^fggl?
sjiouldjtTeast consider SvTie^yidmgi^
jtal assets. A right to deferred compete
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tion acquired during marriage, or that portion of one's right to deferred compensation acquired during marriage, should not
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irrespective of when the vested funds are payaEIe! Thus, marital property "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
this includes any such pension fund or insurance." Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d
1274 (Utah 1978).
However, an award of a part of a
spouse's retirement funds may create significant problems. In some instances, marital assets are sparse, income is low, and an
award of an equitable share of retirement
assets might work a substantial hardship.
Courts have, however, awarded the value
of the assets on a periodic payment plan
and, in some instances, have provided for
payments when payout begins. This alternative should be employed only in rare
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated:
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible
. . . [Wlhere other assets for equitable
distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no present value can
be established and the parties are unable
to reach agreement, resort must be had
to a form of deferred distribution based
upon fixed percentages.
656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76,
79-80 (1981)).
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension
funds is not necessarily consistent with
principles of equitable distribution in all
caseB. The purpose of divorce is to end
marriage and allow the parties to make as
much of a clean break from each other as
is reasonably possible. An award of deferred compensation which ties a couple
together long after divorce can frustrate
.that objective.
[tty) Nevertheless, the division of retirement funds between two persons can be

accomplished when necessary. For example, in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required
to pay one-half the net present value of his
retirement plan, $56,850, to his former wife
in five annual installments. The court
awarded present value of the share to be
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the
parties in a 'financial entanglement that
would continue for approximately twenty
or thirty years and would probably result
in further court hearings and cause future
animosity between the parties.'" Id. at
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible alternative for dealing with the value of the
retirement account in this case. Because
of the sizeable assets in this case, another
alternative would be reapportionment of
the property distribution to offset the value
of the retirement account.
In any event, it will be necessary on
remand to determine the value of the retirement account. The account has a
present value of between $73,000 ftTlf*
$177,000, and the Court should at least
consider the value of the account in making
the property distribution.
Another alternative for the apportionment of property lies in the trial court's
discretion to award the entire value of a
solely owned professional corporation to
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308
(Utah 1982). In Dogu, the earning power
of the corporation resulted entirely from
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work;
however, there were questions as to his
ability to do so. The trial court awarded
the wife savings certificates, bank accounts, and stock to offset the present liquid assets of the corporation (accounts receivable and bank accounts). The trial
court did not attempt to value the future
earnings potential of the corporation, presumably because of questions regarding
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to generate income for the corporation.
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr.
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched
institution, whose twenty-three members
have banded together in a business organization. It is not likely to be highly susceptible to earnings interruptions because
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of the ill health of one of its members.
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless.
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures,
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726,
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's accountants value the business much higher. Neither gave consideration to the good will
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs.
Gardner was entitled to findings in support
of the denial of her request for a portion of
those assets. Instead, the trial court disposed of the medical assets in the same
sentence in which it disposed of the retirement account.
The medical assets at issue here were not
included in the retirement account, but the
trial court seems to have assumed that
they were one and the same. In any event,
no findings of fact were made as to the
value of the medical assets. The award to
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and
medical assets may be proper and equitable. However, we cannot adequately
review the trial court's determinations on
the basis of the sparse findings before us.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
valuation of the medical assets and retirement accounts and reconsideration of the
distribution of the marital property on the
basis of those findings.
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an equitable and legal property interest in the
medical degree of her former spouse.
Whether professional degrees and professional practice constitute marital property
subject to valuation and distribution upon
the dissolution of a marriage has been the
subject of much debate in recent years,
especially in the wake of decisions where
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g.,
Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J. 488,

453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien,
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been the
subject of discussion in our Court of Appeals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen,
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987).
One authority has argued that educational achievements are susceptible to valuation,2 but there is judicial authority for the
proposition that the value of an education
does not fall within the common understanding of the concept of property:
An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
"property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at
531.
The cases which have refused to hold
that professional degrees and practice constitute marital property subject to valuation and distribution have nonetheless assessed and divided the value of the degree

ferred to as good will. Good will is properly
1. A marriage may be analogized to a partnersubject to equitable distribution upon divorce.
ship. Upon dissolution of the marital "partnership," an equitable distribution should be based
See, e.g.f Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d
on consideration of all assets, not just those that
1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of Flecge, 91 Wash.
survive the trip to the bottom of the balance
2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The
sheet. Where appropriate, value may be given
Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings,
to that "something in business, which gives rea18 Fam.L.0. 213 (1984).
sonable expectancy of preference in the race of
competition," commonly known as good will. 2. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette. Can the Economic
Jackson v. Caldwell 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d
Value of an Education Really Be Measured?. 21
667, 670 (1966).
J.Fam.L. 51 (1983).
The ability of a business to generate income
from its continued patronage is commonly re-
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or practice on the basis of other legal and
equitable remedies. These cases follow a
common fact pattern. Typically, the husband is supported throughout a long graduate or professional program by the working
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after
graduation. In such cases, there are few
marital assets to distribute, and the courts
have considered other ways of compensating the spouse. In a limited number of
cases, the courts focus on the educational
degree or professional practice. See generally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 N J .
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847;
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theories of valuation.
[6] We agree that an educational or
professional degree is difficult to value and
that such a valuation does not easily fit the
common understanding of the character of
property. However, at least in the present
instance, we need not reach the question of
whether such a valuation may ever take
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this
case from others in which equity and fairness required another solution. Where, as
here, the marriage is of long duration,
present earnings and business assets provide a more accurate measure of the true
worth of the wife's investment in her husband's degree. The home, farm, automobiles, and other assets of approximately
$500,000 allow for a divisible award between the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs.
Gardner has realized benefits from the
medical degree in the form of a greater
property settlement and higher alimony.
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a property interest in Mr. Gardner's medical degree inappropriate under these facts and
affirm the findings of the trial court in this
regard.
[7,8] Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial
court's award of alimony was insufficient
and inequitable. We agree. An alimony
award should, after a marriage such as this
and to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possi-

ble to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley,
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). In Jones,
we enumerated three factors important in
fixing an alimony award: (1) the financial
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the
ability of the wife to produce sufficient
income for herself; and (3) the ability of
the husband to provide support. Jones,
700 P.2d at 1075. See also English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977).
Mrs. Gardner has not been gainfully employed since 1958. Though testimony indicated that she was skilled as an executive
secretary, it will be difficult for her to
regain these skills and become reemployed
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner,
by contrast, retains his career as a physician with earnings of $6,000 per month.
The trial court awarded Mrs. Gardner
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced
to $600 per month following Mr. Gardner's
retirement. The court provided no explanation of the basis for the preretirement
award and stated that the reduction in alimony following Mr. Gardner's retirement
reflected a drop in his earning potential,
Mrs. Gardner's eligibility for social security, and the fact that the house would be
sold, providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid
assets. We think that this award was an
abuse of discretion.
Mrs. Gardner executed an affidavit prior
to trial listing her monthly expenses at
$1,700 per month. The trial court apparently relied on testimony at the hearing
and on a prior affidavit which set her
monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is
not employed and has little prospect of
being reemployed. Viewing her future
earning potential and current monthly expenses, however arrived at, against that of
Mr. Gardner's, we think it is clear that the
award is insufficient to equalize the parties' standards of living.
Similarly, the trial court's award of $600
monthly alimony following Mr. Gardner's
retirement is also unreasonably low. Mr.
Gardner has substantial retirement assets.
Should Mr. Gardner reach retirement age,
these assets will have increased substan-
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pension and will qualify for social security
payments only as an "ex-wife married over
20 years." She will not qualify for regular
social security benefits- until she has
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Because the likelihood of her providing for
her own retirement is small, we find that
the trial court's award is insufficient to
equalize the parties' standards of living
following Mr. Gardner's retirement.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of the above and in light
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court
must evaluate the wife's ability to support
herself based on findings and conclusions
under the standards stated in Acton v.
Delirany 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will
be able to meet her monthly needs either
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement,
and this is the focus of our concern. Our
review of the record therefore indicates
that the alimony award may have to be
increased.
However, explicit findings
based on the factors in Jones are needed to
support that conclusion.
[9] Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this
Court to make an award of attorney fees.
The trial court made no specific award of
attorney fees. However, in its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
made clear that an award of a one-third
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building
account and the division of the money market certificate was for the purpose of assisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr.
Gardner correctly notes that a request for
attorney fees must be accompanied by evidence at trial as to the nature and amount
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such showing was made at trial, and the findings do
not support Mrs. Gardner's request Insofar as we have approved the property settlement of the lower court, the award of
attorney fees made part of that settlement
is affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

HOWE, Justice (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in the majority opinion except in
that part dealing with alimony. As to that
part, I dissent for the following reasons.
First, in reversing and remanding for a
valuation of the medical and retirement
assets and a redistribution of marital property on the basis of those findings, Mrs.
Gardner's financial position will undoubtedly improve and her income increase. This
increase will have a direct bearing on the
amount of alimony which she should be
awarded. It is premature for us to now
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600
per month awarded by the trial court is
inadequate. It may well be that after the
redistribution of property is made, the
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and
could even be excessive. This is especially
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's
retirement. Any amount of his retirement
awarded to her on remand decreases her
need for alimony and his ability to pay it.
The trial judge recognized this reality when
he wrote in his memorandum decision:
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons
for this reduction are: by the time of
retirement, the home should be sold and
the plaintiff should have liquid assets;
defendant's income will materially decrease; plaintiff will also receive some
social security benefits. It is my intent
in awarding to the defendant his medical
assets and retirement assets that alimony shall be paid therefrom and that the
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as
against the defendant's estate if he
should predecease her. This claim shall
be in the amount of $50,000.
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony requested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at
that amount, but based on her assumption
that the court would allow her to continue
to live on the twenty-one-acre country estate of the parties on which is a six-bedroom home with garages for four cars, a
bam, and other outbuildings. Consequently, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month request, she included the monthly mortgage
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payment, the property taxes, insurance premiums on that property, monthly utilities
on that property, and amounts for the care
of the farm animals and for farm, garden,
and house maintenance and repairs. However, the trial court did not award her the
country estate or allow her to permanently
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell
the property as soon as possible. The majority opinion does not assail this determination. The sale of the property ordered
tiy the court necessarily eliminated many of
tUe monthly expenses which formed a basis
for the $1,700 alimony request. The trial
court, therefore, acted properly in excluding those items of expense in determining a
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and
presumably included instead the cost of
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less
expensive quarters. On cross-examination,
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of
living would be less if she did not live on
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by
the trial court was clearly within the range
of the evidence before the court. The majority does not claim that $1,200 was
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude
before we may upset findings of fact by
the trial court

position of the parties after their divorce.
Again, this concept is contrary to the three
factors to be considered which we enumerated in Janes v. Jones, supra: (1) the financial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the
husband to provide support. We have said
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as
possible the same standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage and she
should be prevented from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gardner is a highly skilled surgeon earning
$6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not
employed at the time of the divorce. She
thought she could maintain the standard of
living to which she had become accustomed
if she received $1,700 per month alimony.
If their financial positions after divorce are
to be equal, she presumably should have
$3,000 per month alimony. I do not think
the majority intends that result.

The object of divorce is to set the parties
free of each other after an equitable division of property is made and, if needed, an
We have always accorded trial courts award of alimony is made which will enable
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. both parties to maintain as near as possible
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the the standard of living they enjoyed during
trial court's judgment because it is only one- the marriage. The parties then go their
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and separate ways and attempt to rebuild their
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan- lives. But because of the disparity in their
dard of living." Insofar as this writer earning ability, the wife here, who has
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has training as a secretary but has not been
never been expressed as a percentage of employed for thirty-three years, will never
the husband's monthly income. This is a earn as much as her husband-surgeon.
new concept, completely foreign to the test Our cases do not suggest that the divorce
recognized in Jones t>. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 decree should attempt to cure this disparity
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony by "equalizing" their future incomes.
award. Since the monthly income of divorced husbands is not all the same, the
monthly needs and financial conditions of
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and
other factors have to be considered, percentages should not be employed or relied
on.

r

c Finally, I strongly dissent from the repeated references in the majority opinion
that alimony is to "equalize" the financial
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notated.*
[4] Nowhere in the Utah Constitution
or Utah Code Annotated does the legislature give the Tax Commission the unbridled discretion to make findings of fact
beyond the scope of what is presented in
the hearings or inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Although it is a "universally
recognized rule" that this court must "take
some cognizance of the expertise of the
agency in its particular field and accordingly to give some deference to its determination," ,0 the agency's decision must rest
upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a
creation of fiat 11
[5] It is unclear from the record how
the Tax Commission arrived at the figures
it used in calculating the fair market value
of petitioner's property. First National has
upheld its burden to marshal all of the
evidence in support of the Tax Commission's findings and has shown that on the
record before us those findings are inconsistent with the evidence presented.
We remand for the purpose of requiring
the Tax Commission to more fully articulate the basis for its findings and determination of fair market value in light of the
evidence presented in the hearing.
within such limitations as the Legislature may
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment and
valuation of property within the counties.
The duties imposed upon the State Board of
Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of
this State shall be performed by the State Tax
Commission.
In each county of this State there shall be a
County Board of Equalization consisting of
the Board of County Commissioners of said
county. The County Boards of Equalization
shall adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of the real and personal property
within their respective counties, subject to
such regulation and control by the State Tax
Commission as may be prescribed by law.
The State Tax Commission and the County
Boards of Equalization shall each have such
other powers as may be prescribed by the
Legislature.
9. Section 59-1-210 states in pertinent part: .
The powers and duties of the commission are
as follows:
(7) to exercise supervision over assessors
and county boards of equalization, and over

HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEW
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
(o
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David BURT, Plaintiff and Appellee^
v.
Betty Mae BURT, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890190-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 12, 1990.

Former spouses' property wasjiffi
and alimony awarded to wife bvlSvog
decree entered in the Second.jfD2
Court, Weber County, Stanton M^lSj
Wife appealed. The Court of*]
Orme, J., held that- (\) nronertv whic
other county officers in the,perf<
their duties relating to the assessnjj
erty and collection of taxes.-so£t
ments of property are just and~\
ing to fair market value, and
burden is distributed without*
crimination;
(23) to correct any error in an;
made by it at any time befbrqg 1
and report the correction to i u ~
tor, who shall enter the co:
upon the assessment roll;
(25) to perform any further duj
by law, and exercise all powers.
the performance of its duties:^
(27) to comply with the proc&Q
quirements of Chapter 46b.'Tif
adjudicative proceedings.
10. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Sfflj
590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979}
11. Hurley v. Board of Review ojm
767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988)3
Light, 590 P.2d at 335.
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inherited, as well as its appreciated value,
wife's separate property; (2) trial
court failed to enter specific findings on
needs and condition of wife necessary to
justify award of alimony; (3) value of parties' retirement benefits were marital assets, subject to equitable distribution upon
divorce; and (4) wife was not entitled to
award of attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
was

1. Divorce <s=>252.3(3)
In property division incident to divorce,
inherited or donated property, including its
appreciated value, is generally separate
from marital estate and hence is left with
receiving spouse.
2. Divorce e=>252.3(3)
Inherited or donated property may be
part of marital estate, subject to division
incident to divorce, if nonreceiving spouse
augments, maintains, or protects property
through his or her efforts, parties have
inextricably commingled the property with
marital property so that it has lost its separate character, or the recipient spouse has
contributed all or part of the property to
the marital estate.
_1 Divorce <e=>252.3(3)
k^ Wife's inheritance maintained its sepagkLcharacter even though inherited funds
lad .been substantially changed in form,
«[here inheritance was readily traceable to
segregated accounts, portfolios and real estate.
^Divorce e=>241, 252.3(3)
^. In property division incident to divorce,
interest in inherited property to nonheir
JPouse may be awarded in lieu of alimony
** in other extraordinary situations where
^uity so demands.
*• Divorce <s>253(4)
•. *n Property division incident to divorce,
*J*w court erred in not making sufficient
Swings to justify decision awarding wife's
^ r e in marital home to husband as an
V* 8 ^ to husband's putative interest in
^ **e Purchased by wife with separate insetted funds

6. Divorce <3=>237
Gross disparity in income resulting
from property division incident to divorce
may be remedied by awarding alimony.
7. Divorce <s=>237, 249.7
While trial court should equitably apportion property and calculate alimony payments, alimony may not be automatically
awarded whenever there is a disparity between parties' incomes; where nearly all
income at issue is simply return on property interests, the trial court should first
distribute property interest and only then
consider need for alimony.
8. Divorce <s=*231
Alimony is appropriate to enable receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as
possible, standard of living enjoyed during
marriage and to prevent spouse from becoming a public charge.
9. Divorce <s=>239
Trial court abused its discretion by
awarding alimony without making specific
finding* nf_faA*-*w finsrtnnl nnnHr, and conditions of receiving ^pojase^abjhty of re-

ceiving spouse to produce sufficient in<^me,-a^d-i^spondtng"^p^use*s"" ability to
provide support.
10. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
Retirement benefits which accrue during marriage are marital assets subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce.
11. Divorce <®=>224
Party who was awarded fees by trial
court in divorce decree and prevails on appeal generally will be awarded fees, and
attorneys fees will generally not be awarded on appeal where trial court did not
award fees below, except when party
presents well-supported claim of changed
circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
12. Costs <s=>260(5)
Attorney fees may be awarded in appeal from divorce decree where appeal is
frivolous, regardless of trial court's ruling
on fees.
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13. Divorce <s=>225
Attorney fees would not be awarded to
wife on appeal where trial court did not
award fees to wife and where wife made no
showing of changed circumstances necessitating an award.
14. Divorce <s==>254(2)
In property settlement incident to divorce, trial court may award spouse share
of income stream from vested retirement
benefits as benefits are paid as a property
award, not alimony, and thus award is not
terminable upon remarriage. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-5.
15. Divorce <2>252.2
In division of property incident to divorce, the overriding consideration is that
ultimate division be equitable: that property be fairly divided between parties, given
their contributions during marriage and
their circumstances at time of divorce.
Pete N. Vlahos, F. Kim Walpole, Ogden,
for defendant and appellant.
John T. Caine, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellee.
OPINION
Before BENCH, GARFF, and ORME,
JJ.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Betty Mae Burt appeals from
the trial court's entry of a divorce decree,
assigning error to the division of the parties' marital property and the award to her
of $300 per month as alimony. Defendant
also seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
Plaintiff David Burt and defendant were
married in 1947. Two children were born
of the marriage, both of whom reached
majority before the commencement of this
action. At the time this action was filed,
plaintiff had been retired from government
1. The plaintiff jointI> inherited the rental prop-

employment since 1976 and was receivffl
regular retirement payments of $l,350m^
month. Plaintiff also received an addition
al $616 per month primarily from rentali
income and from a small watch repair i t r ^
ness which produced nominal income!;*!
fendant received monthly income of $ | l l l
from Social Security, $185 from an Indiv^j
ual Retirement Account, and $515 in } int|9|
est and dividends from her investments
The net disparity in monthly incomesISS
plaintiff and defendant amounts to $850tf"
favor of plaintiff.
"*8
While the disparity in income is mTfavo|
of plaintiff, an even more dramatic differs
ence in property exists in favor of defllS
dant. Between 1969 and 1972, defends?!
received a total of $71,600 by inheritance!
Over the years she made various mveit/l
ments and substantially increased hej^holdg!
ings, which amounted to at least $174"60|F
by the time of trial, and even more accord^
ing to plaintiff's evidence. She purchase
a home valued at $65,000, using investmenl
income, in which she was living at the^ugj
of divorce. Early in the marriage,^
ties jointly purchased a maritaKhpmi
loan for which had been fully^satis:
1973. Plaintiff was a w a r d e d ^
free of any claim by defendantThe plaintiff was also awardei
fifty percent interest in an mne ^{£i
which generated the rental incom|fra
to above. Plaintiff was allowed
his full retirement income and;
tionally awarded savings account
$28,509. Plaintiff was, however
to pay defendant $300 monthlj|u|
On appeal, defendant* :pnma
lenges the trial court's failure^
sate her for her joint interest in*th|!
home, suggesting the courtier
garding the parties' home—a
awarded solely to plaintiff—as^#
offset against defendant's home, wtoj
been purchased solely with hgr^fig]
funds. The defendant also chaHgnr
court's failure to award her .*J§p®
plaintiffs government retireme^
acquired during the marriage, ^
vivor annuity benefits incident^
erty with his brother.
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She claims the alimony awarded her in an
effort to narrow the parties' income differential was not an adequate substitute for
the retirement benefits to which she was
entitled as a matter of property distribution.

contributed all or part of the property to
the marital estate. Id.

[1,2] Inherited or donated property, as
well as its appreciated value, is generally
regarded as separate from the marital estate and hence is left with the receiving
spouse in a property division incident to
divorce. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). However, such
property may appropriately be considered
part of the marital estate, subject to division, when the other spouse has by his or
her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or donated property,
id.; Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504
P.2d 1380, 1381 (1973); where the parties
have inextricably commingled the property
with marital property so that it has lost its
separate character, Mortensen, 760 P.2d at
308; or where the recipient spouse has

[3] Even though defendant's inheritance is readily traceable and has not been
commingled, plaintiff argues that defendant's inherited funds have substantially
changed in form—they were received as
cash but have become stocks, bonds and
real estate—and therefore they should be
considered part of the marital estate.
Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the
Court stated that property which had lost
its "identity through commingling or exchanges" could properly be considered part
of the marital estate. 760 P.2d at 308. We
disagree with plaintiffs reading of Mortensen. The thrust of Mortensen is not
whether the mere form of property has
changed, but whether it has lost its "identity" as separate property. Id. The separate character of the defendant's inheritance has been maintained in segregated
accounts and portfolios and the home she
purchased. Conversion from one investment medium to another does not, by itself,
destroy the integrity of segregation. To
accept plaintiff's view of Mortensen would
unreasonably discourage the prudent investment of inherited funds. In order to
<
preserve the property's separate character,
the donee or heir would be required to
maintain the property in the same physical
form in which it was received, be it securities, real estate, or cash. The law does not
require such economic absurdity.
[4-6] Having so concluded, we nonetheless recognize that this precept does not
place defendant's separate property totally
beyond the court's reach in an equitable
property division. The court may award an
interest in the inherited property to the
non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony, Weaver
v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928,
929 (1968)vor in "other extraordinary situations where equity so demands."2 Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; see also, Naranjo
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct.
App.1988); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830,

*• In the event the trial court does not find the
situation warrants awarding the plaintiff some
credit against defendant's inherited property,
an
d plaintiff is required to part with a portion
°f "his" retirement and buy out defendant's in-

terest in the marital home, the court may remedy any gross disparity in income by an award of
alimony to plaintiff. See Weaver, 442~P.2d at
929; Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 167 P.2d
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

MARITAL HOME
The trial court allowed plaintiff to retain
the marital home without any claim against
it by defendant. Defendant suggests the
court erred in simplistically giving each
party a home of equivalent value without
regard to ownership—her house was really
her house while "his" house was "theirs."
However, the court's intended analysis was
apparently that plaintiff was entitled to an
equitable offset against the amounts which
the defendant had been able to amass
through investment of her inherited funds
which, if not for the plaintiffs all but exclusive payment of the mortgage and
household expenses, even during the substantial period when both worked, would
have been partially diverted, of necessity,
towards those joint expenses. In making
such an award the court, in effect, awarded
a substantial portion of defendant's inherited funds to plaintiff.
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833 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, weagree with defendant that the trial court
did not make sufficient findings to justify
its decision to award defendant's share in
the marital home to plaintiff as an offset to
plaintiffs putative interest in the home
purchased by defendant with inherited
funds. See, e.g., Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.
1988) (trial court must make findings on all
material issues); Naranjo, 751 P.2d at
1147 (trial court must support its decision
with adequate findings).
Accordingly,
without necessarily implying that the result was incorrect given the peculiar facts
of this case, we must remand for further
findings in support of the court's disposition of the marital home and the defendant's separate property.
ALIMONY
17-9J The trial court granted defendant
alimony in the amount of $300 per month in
an attempt to help equalize the monthly
income of the parties. While equity should
be the watchword as the trial court apportions property and calculates alimony payments, see Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987), alimony may
not be automatically awarded whenever
there is disparity between the parties' incomes.3 Alimony is appropriate "to enable
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly
as possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and to prevent the
spouse from becoming a public charge."
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
CtApp.1987).
A trial court must consider three factors
in setting a reasonable award of alimony:
3.

It is questionable from the record that this is a
case warranting alimony in favor of defendant,
whose substantial accumulated wealth and
monthly income should permit her a standard
of living comparable to what she enjoyed during
the marriage. Rather, alimony was the device
the court selected to narrow the gap between
the parties' incomes. Especially since nearly all
income at issue in this case is simply the return
on property interests, the court's approach was
incorrect. Proper distribution of property interests of one sort or another should have come
first, and only then would alimony need to be
considered. Defendant has conceded that the
alimony award should be vacated if the marital

1) the financial conditions and needs'•*#
the receiving spouse; 2) the ability 0f tk!
receiving spouse to produce a suffice
income for him or herself; and 3) •}*
ability of the responding spouse to Dm.
vide support
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 pw
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The triaf
court failed to enter specific findings oa!
the needs and condition of the defendant
prohibiting effective review of the alimony
award.4 We have held that the omission of
particular findings in alimony awards is arf
abuse of discretion. Id.; Ruhsam v. RuKsam} 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct.App.1987)?
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
further findings on the needs and conditions of both parties relative to alimony*
In conjunction with making adequate fini
ings as to the appropriate distribution of
inherited property in light of our discussion
above, the court may then determine the
propriety and amount of alimony for either
party.
RETIREMENT INCOME
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to
retain his full retirement benefits, which,
like those of defendant that she was permitted to retain in full, were accumulated
during the marriage. These benefits had
not only "vested" prior to the divorce—entitlement had ripened and regular distributions were being made.
[10] Retirement benefits accrued during marriage must normally be "considered
a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce." Motes v. Motes, 786
P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Greene
property is properly divided. See also note 2,
supra.
4. But see note 3, supra.
5. The court's general comment that the pa r t i c s
financial practices were "highly unusual" is not
enough. This [cjourt has consistently emphasized the importance of specific findings—
Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). This is particularly important iri divorce
actions. See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331. 1333-34 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (findings
must demonstrate that the court's decision logically follows from the evidence before it).
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v. ureene, vai r.za 827, 830 (Utah CtApp.
1988). Here, the value of the parties' retirement benefits may readily be calculated
and equitably apportioned between the parties as the court on remand reconsiders
distribution of other marital assets.6 See
Motes, 786 P.2d at 234.
Defendant also seeks a share of the survivor annuity benefit incident to the plaintiffs government retirement benefit, which
would provide continued income to defendant upon plaintiffs death. On remand,
the court may treat the annuity in a similar
fashion to the retirement income stream,
see note 8, infra, fixing a present value
and considering that sum in the distribution scheme, or awarding the defendant an
interest in the annuity to protect her right
to continued payment of her share of the
retirement income.
ATTORNEY FEES
[11-13] The defendant seeks an award
of attorney fees incurred on appeal, relying
on Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331
(Utah CtApp. 1988), and Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-3 (1989). In Rasband, we stated
that a trial court has the power to make an
award of attorney fees in divorce actions,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
(1989), upon a showing of financial need
and reasonableness. 752 P.2d at 1336. Ordinarily, when -fees in a "divorce were
awarded below to* the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to
that party on appeal. ' Weston v. Weston,
773 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah Ct.App.1989);
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162
(Utah Ct.App.1989). Conversely, when
they were not awarded below, we will not
generally award them on appeal, except
when a party has presented a well-sup*• In evaluating the nature of defendant's IRA,
the court must determine whether contributions
were made with inherited funds, as an investment device, or with money earned from employment during the marriage to provide a true
retirement benefit. If the former, the IRA is
defendant's separate property; if the latter, it
should be treated like the other retirement benefits.
'• See note 6, supra.

ported claim of changed circumstances.
See Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057,
1061-62 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Riche v.
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The major exception, inapplicable
here, is when an appeal is frivolous, in
which event we will award fees regardless
of the trial court's ruling on fees. See, e.g.,
Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah
CtApp. 1990); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365
(Utah CtApp. 1988). Attorney fees were
not awarded to defendant below and she
has made no showing of changed circumstances necessitating that they be awarded
to her on appeal. Accordingly, she is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
SUMMARY
[14] Defendant's inherited property and
its increase are properly characterized as
defendant's separate property. The same
is true of plaintiff's inherited property.
Neither party's property has lost its separate character. All retirement benefits, including defendant's Social Security and
possibly her IRA,7 are marital property and
must be divided accordingly. As a measure of convenience, the court may simply
award defendant one-half of the difference
between the value of plaintiffs and defendant's retirement 8 -» However, such '- an
award is not terminable alimony; it is a
property interest Similarly; the - marital
home and possibly the savings accounts9
are marital property and defendant must
be granted her share.
[15] The foregoing discussion assumes
the proper application of Utah law in a
situation where no extraordinary circumstances are found by the court to exist
8. While a present settlement is preferable, Motes
v. Motes, 786 P.2d at 234, the trial court may
award the defendant a share of the income
stream from the retirement benefits as they are
paid, id., not in the form of alimony but as a
property award not terminable upon remarriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989).
9. The court must also consider whether the savings accounts awarded to plaintiff were marital
property or separate property derived from
plaintiffs inheritance.
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However, these are presumptive only and
not immutable principles. "The overriding
consideration is that the ultimate division
be equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1987). On remand, the court should
first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the
separate property of one or the other.
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all
of his or her- separate property and fifty
percent of the marital property.- But rather than simply enter such a decree, the
court should then consider the existence of
exceptional circumstances and, if any be
shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances
and in conformity with our decision. That
having been done, the final step is to consider whether, following appropriate division of the property, one party or the other
is entitled to alimony.10
We recognize that the trial court attempted to do equity in its distribution of
the marital estate and acted in the face of
atypical circumstances. Notwithstanding,
the court's division of the estate cannot
stand undisturbed when we are not
presented with sufficient findings to demonstrate that the court's ruling comports
with established law. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings. The parties
will bear their own attorney fees and costs.

Raychelle MERRIAM, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Todd MERRIAM, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 890484-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 16, 1990.

Mother appealed from divorce decriS
of the Sixth District Court, Sanpete CoiuS
ty, Don V. Tibbs, J., awarding custody of
parties' child to father. The Court of Ap^
peals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) trial
court could rely on child custody evaluation
report even though it was never formally
admitted into evidence and evaluator was
not quahfied as expert or called as witness
at trial; (2) father's testimony supported
finding regarding mother's extramarital affairs, and those affairs could be considered
in custody decision; (3) finding that neither
parent had been child's primary caretakei
during pendency of divorce did not refled
confusion by trial court, and balance oi
factors did not otherwise tip in favor oi
custodial status quo; and (4) trial couri
gave adequate weight to desirability o\
keeping child and his half-brother together
Affirmed.

BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.
1. Divorce <£=*301
Child custody evaluation report could
be relied on in making custody determination, even though report was not formally
admitted into evidence and evaluator was
never qualified as expert or called as witness at trial. Judicial Administration Rule
4-903; Rules of Evid., Rule 706(a).
10. In prescribing a systematic approach on remand, we do not suggest any particular outcome following reconsideration. We do recognize that our alteration of pivotal portions of
the trial court's decree may necessitate reassessment and adjustment of other portions of the

decree and that the trial court has the authority
to reconsider its entire decree in light of this
court's opinion and to make such adjustment
as may be necessan to achieve an equitable
overall result
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LeNore M. GILL, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

tion. (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one
Judge concurring and one Judge not participating.)

v.
Ruland J. GILL, Defendant
and Respondent

Gary L. Paxton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant

No. 19142.

Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 29, 1986.
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1986.
Wife appealed from order of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dentfis
Frederick, J., dividing marital assets in divorce action. The Supreme Court, H*ft>
CJ., held that evidence was sufficient to
support finding that husband did not hide
or secrete marital assets.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J., filed dissenting opinion
in which Howe, J., concurred.
1. Divorce «=>235, 252.1, 286(2)
In adjusting financial and property interests of parties to divorce, trial court is
afforded considerable discretion, and its actions are cloaked with presumption of validity. (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one
Judge concurring and one Judge not participating.)
*
2- Divorce *=>206, 253(2)
Evidence regarding wife's knowledge
k
rt operations of husband's businesses was
efficient to support finding that husband
djd not hide or secrete marital assets in
fviolation of restraining order or rights of
• J*fe- (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one
fudge concurring and one Judge not particS*tfog.)
^ Divorce <s=>192
Not requiring husband to assume and
1*7 additional fees incurred by wife in di£** action to resolve wife's contention
??*. husband had secreted or dissipated
T***tal assets was not abuse of discretion,
^ 8 ?!i t evidence in support of such cont£n-

HALL, Chief Justice:
This appeal challenges the propriety of
the district court's division of marital assets. Plaintiff contends that she was entitled to a proportionately larger share of the
marital assets to compensate her for defendant's alleged dissipation of those asaction, in direct contravention of the
court's injunction and restraining order.
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce
in September 1979. The parties' marital
assets consisted of a residence, an automobile, a pickup truck and camper, several
horses, trailers, and related tack, various
life insurance policies, guns, camping
equipment, furniture, jewelry, ^personal
items, an ongoing business known as Fleetway, Inc., and a defunct business known as

Gill's Tire Market
In October 1979, at plaintiffs instance
and request and pursuant to stipulation, a
restraining order was entered, against defendant by which he was enjoined from*
encumbering or disposing of any marital
property and any assets of Gill's Tire Market or Fleetway, Inc., without the, express
or without first obtaining an appropriate
court order. At the time the order was
entered, defendant was operating both
businesses and making his living therefrom. Plaintiff did not participate in the
management of either of the businesses,
and after the restraining order was entered, defendant continued to operate
them.
In December 1979, plaintiff sought and
obtained an order bifurcating the divorce
issue. A decree of divorce was obtained in
January 1980, reserving the issue of prop-
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erty division for a subsequent proceeding.
At the time the divorce decree was entered,
defendant was continuing to operate the
businesses known as GUI's Tire Market and
Fleetway, Inc.
In October 1980, following the bankruptcy of Gill's Tire Market and after Fleetway,
Inc., had also failed, defendant utilized the
remaining assets to open a retail tire store,
which he operated under the name of Tire
City for approximately two years. Two
months prior to trial, defendant sold the
assets of Tire City for $15,000, a sum nearly equal to Tire City's indebtedness.
At trial, the focal issue was plaintiffs
Contention that defendant had intentionally
secreted or disposed of marital assets to
deprive plaintiff of her rightful share. The
trial court specifically found that defendant
had not hidden any of the assets of the
marital, estate and n had not attempted to
deprive plaintiff of her interest in those
assets. The°court then divided the assets
oiT hand and^ awarded^generally equal
shares to <each party. The court also ordered that the accounts receivable from the
Fleetway Tire Market business be divided
equally; that defendant pay the business
debts and the marital debts incurred prior
to separation; that any proceeds remaining
from the business bankruptcy be divided
equally; and that defendant pay all income
tax obligations owing for the years 19771979.
The court limited its award of attorney
fees to those incurred up to the time the
decree of divorce was obtained in January
1980. The court made no award for fees
incurred by plaintiff for the purpose of
showing that defendant had intentionally
dissipated the marital assets.
[1] The long-recognized and oft-repeated standard of appellate review permits this Court to overturn the judgment of
the trial court only when the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary or
the trial court has abused its discretion or

misapplied principles of law.1 In adjusting
the financial and property interests of parties to divorce, the trial court is afforded
considerable discretion,2 and its actions are
cloaked with a presumption of validity3
[2] The record reflects that although
Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc., were
not prospering, the parties were dependent
upon the operation of those businesses for
their livelihood. It necessarily follows that
at the time the court entered its order
restraining the disposition of marital assets, it was within the contemplation of all
concerned that defendant would continue to
operate the businesses.
It was reasonable for the trial court to
conclude that plaintiff was aware of defendant's business revenues and that plaintiff knew defendant had transferred the
remaining assets of the defunct Fleetway,
Inc., to the new business operated under
the name of Tire City. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that ^commencing in
October 1979 and continuing to the time of
trial, plaintiff engaged m extensive discovery proceedings seeking evidence concerning defendant's fmancial affairs and
the busmesses he continued to operate, specifically Tire City. Furthermore, no effort
was made by plaintdff to restrain defendant
from operating his busmesses, and no citation for contempt was sought or obtained
for any violation of the court's restraining
order.
Trial of this case extended over a period
of three days, and the record is replete
with evidence that bears upon the property
division issue. Not unexpectedly, most of
the testimony was controverted, but a canvass of the record fails to disclose any
evidence that clearly preponderates contrary to the findings of the trial court that
defendant did not hide or secrete marital
assets in violation of the court's order or
the rights of plaintiff.

1. Wiese v. Wiese, Utah. 699 P.2d 700, 701 (1985). 3. Savage v. Savage, Utah, 658 P.2d 1201. 1203
(1983).
2. ArgyU v. Argyle, Utah. 688 P-2d 468, 470
(1984).
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[3] Plaintiffs remaining contention <?n
appeal is that the court abused its discretion in limiting the award of attorney fees.
In substance and effect, the court concluded that the legal expense of conducting ti»e
extensive discovery proceedings engaged i n
by plaintiff was not reasonable and necessary.

transfer occurred without Mrs. Gill's "express, prior knowledge " and without any
request to or order from the court, as
required by the injunction.

ly $6,000, primarily as a result of Mr. Gill's
transfer of those assets into a new, but
^unsuccessful business, Tire City. That

The majority seems to rely in part on the
fact that prior to the trial on division of
assets, Mrs. Gill failed to petition the trial

Contrary to the suggestion in the majority opinion, resolution of the issue presented
by this case does not turn upon whether
Mrs. Gill proved that Mr. Gill intentionally
In light of plaintiffs failure to demon- hid assets belonging to the marital estate
strate either by way of discovery or by or upon whether Mr. Gill intentionally atevidence elicited at trial that defendant did tempted to deprive Mrs. Gill of her interest
in fact secrete or dissipate marital assets, in the business portion of the marital esthe court did not abuse its discretion in n0t tate. In determining whether one is civilly
requiring defendant to assume and pay the liable for violating an injunction, the element of intent is irrelevant E.g., Rogers
additional fees plaintiff incurred.
v. Pitt, 89 F. 424, 429 (Cir.CtNev.D.1898);
The propriety of the court's limited
Weston v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 158
award of attorney fees is further indicated N.C. 270, 73 S.E. 799, 800 (1912).
bY the relative ability Q{ the parties* ta p^Y
The absence of willfulness does not retheir respective attorneys for services renlieve [an individual] from civil contempt
dered. Plaintiff was employed and earning
Civil as distinguished from criminal conapproximately $12,000 per annum, and detempt is a sanction to enforce compliance
fendant was unemployed and without inwith an order of the court or to compencome from any source.
sate for losses or damages sustained by
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
reason of noncompliance
Since the
purpose is remedial, it matters not with
STEWART, J., concurs.
what intent the defendant did the prohibited act
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (dissenting)
McComb v. "Jacksonville Paper Co':,''336
I dissent^ The issue on appeal is wheth- U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct 497; 499, 93 L.Ed.
er the trial court erred when it found th^t 599 (1949) (citations omitted). .The Utah
Mr. Gill did not violate an injunction prohib- courts have long recognized that civil coniting him "from encumbering or disposing tempt for. violation of a court order or
of in any manner whatsoever; any assets 0 r injunction requires no intent Gunnison
properties of . . . Gill's Tire Market, Inc., or Irrigation Co. v. Peterson, 74 Utah 46G
r
Pleetway, Inc., without the [express, prior
464, 280 P. 715, 717 (1929).
knowledge and approved of [Mrs. GDI] or
Thus, ~ the issue on appeal is simply
without first obtaining* an^rappropriate
Mr.J Gill violated the plain terms of
whether
court order alfter notice ~ and application... ." (Emphasis added.) There is no
conflict in the evidence that at the time the terms of the injunction were clear/ Its
^junction was entered, pursuant to Mr- purpose was to preserve the marital estate
Gill's stipulation, the marital estate includ- against loss. Mr. Gill violated the injunced the business assets of Gill's Tire Market tion. Mrs. Gill clearly sustained damages
^ d Pleetway Tires, Inc. These assets as a result of that violation. The trial
*ere then worth approximately $50,000. court acted contrary to the uncontradicted
% the time the marital estate was divided evidence when it refused to find the injunck December of 1982, the value of the busi- tion had been violated and to compensate
ness assets had diminished to approximate- Mrs. Gill accordingly.
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court to hold her former husband liable for
contempt Despite her failure to do so,
however, the record establishes that she
was diligent in her efforts to protect her
interest j n the assets. Beginning with the
commencement of the divorce addon in December of 1979/ Mrs. Gill took steps to
determine the nature and disposition of the
business assets. Mr. GDI was dilatory and
evasive in responding to her repeated discovery requests. His lack of candor forced
Mrs. Gill to bring several motions to compel, a motion in supplemental proceedings,
orders to show cause, and a motion for
sanctions. As late as the second day of
trial in December of 1982, Mr. Gill was
producing documents relating to the status
of the assets, and even then he did not
comply fully with Mrs. Gill's earlier discovery requests. Many^of the discovery
responses ultimately" supplied were inexcusably dificient i The majority's opinion
allows Mr/ Gill "to, hJenefit from his own
dilatory and' evasive ^tactics. Mrs. Gill
should not be prejudiced for having proceeded, via means other than a contempt
proceeding, to determine the value and disposition of her share of the assets.
I would also hold that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion in limiting
Mrs. Gill's attorney fees, especially because
a significant portion of those fees resulted
from her repeated attempts to force Mr.
Gill to comply with legitimate discovery
requests. It is certainly true, as the majority states, that we should defer to the trial
court under appropriate circumstances.
However, by affirming the unsupportable
order of the trial court in this case, we are
not deferring. Rather, we are abdicating
our responsibility to see that orders reviewed by us are legally supportable, which
the one involved in this case certainly is
not
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does not participate herein.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, Plaintiff,
v.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT In and For CEDAR CITY DEPARTMENT, Iron Coun"
ty, State of Utah, and Patricia J. Meister, Defendants.
No. 20876.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 5, 1986.

The Department of Employment Security petitioned for writ of certiorari tc review orders ^of the Ninth Circuit Court
Iron County, pursuant to defendant's
guilty* pleas to \charge?^of making false
statements to obtain ^unemployment compensation, that defendant pay restitution to
the DES and that the DES cease and desist
its collection efforts of remaining amount
owed to i t The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that (1) trial court's order requiring
defendant to pay restitution to the DES of
the $2,428 she had actually received as a
condition of probation was within its discretion, and the exercise of such discretion
was not an arbitrary extension of judicial
authority so as to effectively redetermine
administration decision by the DES that
claimant repay twice amount which which
she had received by reason of her fraud,
but (2) statute providing that the DES shall
demand repayment of twice amount of unemployment benefits fraudulently collected
required the DES to collect the remaining
one-half of the amount owed by defendant
through civil proceedings or through issuance of a warrant
Order vacated.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare
*=>751
Trial court's order requiring that defendant convicted of making false state-
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Connie Rae POPE, Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Dan LeRoy POPE, Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent
No. 15538.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 15, 1978.
Wife brought divorce proceeding. The
First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy
Christofferson, J., entered judgment divorcing the parties, dividing their property, and
awarding attorney fees and costs to wife,
and husband appealed. The Supreme
Court, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) trial
court's division of marital property resulting in 65% of benefits to wife and 35% to
husband did not constitute abuse of discretion, since husband was awarded incomeproducing assets of family, husband had
two college degrees and several years experience in s operating his business, and wife
had no college education and was unemployed at time of trial; (2) trial court did
not err in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney
fees and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact
that wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether
to pray for costs, and (3) trial court did not
err in ordering that if husband failed to pay
wife specified sum of cash within six
months of trial court's order that such
amount would bear interest at the rate of
10% per year.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce <*=> 252.1, 286(2)
Trial court in divorce action has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting
financial and property interests, and party
appealing therefrom has burden of proving
that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error, or that evidence clearly preponderated against findings, or that
such a serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.

2. Divorce <*=> 252.2
Trial court's division of marital property resulting in 65% of benefits to wife and
35% to husband did^not constitute abuse of
discretion, since husband was awarded income-producing assets'" of family, husband
had two college degrees and several years
experience in operating his business, and
wife had no college education and was unemployed at time of trial.
3. Divorce <*=>189, 196
In divorce action, trial court did not err
in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney fees
and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact that
wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether
to pray for costs. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 54(cXl).
4. Interest <3=>38(1)
In divorce action, trial court did not err
in ordering that if husband failed to pay
wife specified sum of cash within six
months of trial court's order that such
amount would bear interest at the rate of
10% per year.

Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for defendant, appellant, and cross-respondent.
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant.
WILKINS, Justice:
This is a divorce action, in which the
District Court for Cache County, sitting
without a jury, entered a decree divorcing
the parties, dividing their property, and
awarding attorney's fees and costs to plaintiff. References herein to statutes and
rules are to the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended, and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively.
Plaintiff and defendant were married
more than ten years and have two daughters as issue of the marriage. After his
marriage to plaintiff, defendant attended
college and obtained a bachelor's degree in
engineering and a master's degree in busi-
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ness administration. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, terminated her education after one
and one-half years of college and spent her
time caring for the children. During their
marriage, defendant and plaintiff acquired
assets, mentioned infra
[n its division of this property the District
Court awarded to defendant the family
business property and certain other items of
personalty, the net value of which was $76,577. Plaintiff was given the family residence, subject to the existing mortgage, the
household furnishings, and certain other
items of personalty. The net value of this
property was $26,609. The District Court
also ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $24,984 in cash, this being one-half of the
amount by which the net value of property
awarded defendant exceeded that awarded
plaintiff.
Defendant urges on appeal that the District Court erred in calculating the value of
the parties' property and debts, resulting in
an unjust and inequitable division of the
property. He claims the Court failed to
include certain debts owed by defendant
amounting to $24,225 in its calculation of
the value of the business and other property
awarded to him.
[1] It is well established that
The trial court, in a divorce action, has
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property interests.
A party appealing therefrom has the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error; or
the evidence clearly preponderated
against the findings; or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.
English v. English9i\Jtah, 565 P.2d 409, 410
(1977).
[2] However defendant's argument—in
thrust—is that a serious inequity does exist
as the obligation to pay the debts amountI. The District Court ordered that defendant pa>
all debts incurred by the parties since their
marriage, excepting the house mortgage The
debts which totaled $24,225 according to defendant's testimony were incurred by the parties after their marriage

ing to $24,225 results, in effect, in a division
of the net value of property which gives
sixty-five percent to the plaintiff and only
thirty-five percent to the defendant.1 In
light of the facts and circumstances of this
case, we believe, however, that the Court's
division of property is equitable. Defendant was awarded the income-producing assets of the famih
He has two college
degrees and several years experience in operating his businesses and thus has a reasonably assured future of earnings and
profits from his business activities. Plaintiff, however, has no college education and
was unemployed at the time of trial. The
Court awarded her no alimony. She was
given custody of the children and only $135
per month for each child's support.
Defendant's other allegations of errors
and omissions relating to the division of
property are either without merit or nonprejudicial.
[3] Defendant also contends that the
Court's award to plaintiff of $1,5/X) attorney's fees and $30 costs must be reversed
since plaintiff, in her pleadings, prayed for
only $1,000 in attorney's fees and failed
altogether to pray for costs.
Rule 54(c)(1) states in relevant part.
Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it
is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings .
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 564 P2d
1380 (1977), we held that under this Rule,
an award of attorney's fees in excess of
that requested in the pleadings, is allowable
where the proof shows the party to be
entitled to it. Also see Palombi v. D&C
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325
(1969). These cases properly applied Rule
54(cXl) and are controlling here.2 The Dis2. In Palombi, it was stated "The fact that there
was no specific pleading
does not
preclude such an award It is indeed important
that the issue be raised that the parties have
full opportunity to meet it *' Here, certainly
the issue was raised with full opportunity to
meet it
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trict Court's award on these two items was
therefore not improper.
[4] Apparently in order to induce defendant to pay plaintiff the $24,984. cash
within six months the District Court ordered that if the amount remained unpaid
during this period that the amount would
bear interest at the rate of ten percent per
year.
Sec 15-1-4, which requires, except as
noted therein (not applicable here), judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight
percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under Sec. 30-3-5 3 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight
percent where, under the circumstances,
that award is reasonable and equitable. In
this case such an award is both. The interest rate here increased from eight to ten
percent only when defendant failed to pay
the amount within six months. The $24,984
is the only cash which plaintiff was awarded.. The court did not award alimony to
plaintiff a>nd the child support is only $135
per month per child. Plaintiff is unemployed and will reasonably need cash in the
near future for mortgage payments on the
house and for her personal needs. Thus,
requiring that defendant pay an additional
two percent interest on the $24,984 in the
event that defendant failed to pay plaintiff
this amount within six months is a reasonable exercise of the District Court's equitable
discretion.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT,
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM %

Carl WISEMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE PARTNERS and Continental
Casualty, Defendants.
No. 15729.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 26, 1978.
Claimant filed claim for workmen's
compensation benefits arising out of injury
allegedly received in course of his employment The Industrial Commission affirmed
administrative law judge's decision denying
award and denied a motion for review.
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that
construing evidence in light most favorable
to sustaining findings and order of Commission, substantial evidence supported Commission's denial of award.
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation <*=> 1939.5
Upon review of Industrial Commission's decision upholding denial of workmen's compensation award, the Supreme
Court could not weigh contradictory evidence for purpose of interposing its own
judgment as to what the facts were. U.C.
A.1953, 35-1-84.
2. Workers' Compensation <*=>1533
Construing evidence in light most favorable to sustaining findings and order of
Industrial Commission, substantial evidence
supported Commission's denial of workmen's compensation award to claimant,
cause of whose back injury was subject of
contradictory evidence.
William B. Parsons, III, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff.

3. This statute states in relevant part: . .
"the court may make such orders in relation to

. property and the parties .
may be [applicable!."
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V. Glen NOBLE, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Defendant
and Appellee.
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
V. Glen NOBLE, Defendant
and Appellee.

wife's medical and living expenses incurred
as result of husband's shooting of her.
3. Divorce <&=*240(1)
Trial court, in setting alimony, must
attempt to provide support for receiving
spouse sufficient to maintain that spouse
as nearly as possible at standard of living
enjoyed during marriage; trial court must
make sufficient findings to demonstrate
that it considered financial condition and
needs of party seeking alimony, that party's ability to produce sufficient income,
and ability of other party to provide support. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.

Nos. 19934, 20401.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 15, 1988.

In separate actions, wife sued husband
for personal injuries, and parties sought
divorce. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, Don V. Tibbs and George E. Ballif,
JJ., entered divorce decree and dismissed
personal injury action, and appeals were
itaken. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman,
J., held that (1) alimony award and property division were not abuse of discretion; (2)
divorce action did not preclude wife from
bringing personal injury action; and (3)
divorce decree precluded husband from relitigating issue of whether he intentionally
shot wife.
Divorce decree affirmed and remanded; tort judgment reversed and remanded.

1. Divorce <&=>82
If spouses have tort claims pending
against each other which are likely to have
bearing on outcome of divorce action, those
claims should be resolved prior to divorce
proceedings.
2. Divorce «=>237, 252.2
Divorce court did not improperly consider wife's pending tort claim against husband in determining property division and
alimony award when it took into account

4. Divorce <5=>240(2)
Award of $750 per month in alimony
was not abuse of discretion where there
was evidence that husband's shooting of
wife left her totally and permanently disabled, with monthly expenses of $2,600,
and evidence that husband's present income was insufficient to provide for his
needs and still meet wife's needs.
5. Divorce «=»199
Overarching aim of property division,
and of decree to which it and alimony
award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve
fair, just, and equitable result between parties. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
6. Divorce «=>252.3(3)
Property division awarding wife pqption of premarital assets of husband was
not abuse-of discretion given wife's total
disability due to husband's shooting of her,
and husband's inability to provide sufficient alimony to meet wife'? present and
future needs.
7. Damages «=>127
To extent that divorce court took into
account wife's disabilities resulting from
her injuries by husband, by awarding her
more alimony or property than she would
have received but for the injuries, wife was
not entitled to additional damages in pending personal injury action against husband.
8. Divorce <*=>255
Wife's tort claims against husband
were not tried as such in divorce action,
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and thus claim preclusion did not bar wife
from proceeding on intentional tort claims
and recovering damages.
9. Judgment «»634
Elements required if determination of
issue in preceding case is to bind parties in
later case are: issues must be identical,
judgment must be final, party estopped
must be party or in privity with party to
preceding adjudication, and issue must
have been competently, fully, and fairly
litigated.
10. Divorce e=>172
Husband, as defendant in wife's personal injury action, was precluded from
relitigating specific finding made in prior
divorce action that he intentionally shot
wife where issue of husband's liability for
shooting was raised in divorce pleadings,
was fully and fairly litigated, and was expressly made basis for granting wife's
counterclaim for divorce.

Jackson B. Howard, Provo, Raymond M.
Berry, Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for
V. Glen Noble.
W. Eugene Hansen, Salt Lake City, for
Elaine Hanson Noble.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
In this decision, we dispose of two consolidated appeals. The first arises from a
divorce action between Elaine Noble and
Glen Noble in which a divorce decree was
granted to Elaine. Glen seeks to modify
the alimony award and property division.
We affirm the decree but remand for additional findings. The second appeal arises
from the summary judgment dismissing
Elaine's separately filed tort action against
Glen based upon his having shot her.
Elaine seeks a reversal of the order of
dismissal. We reverse the summary judgment and reinstate her intentional tort
claims.
1. Glen was tried and acquitted by a jury of
attempted murder. Neither party argues that

Elaine and Glen were married in July of
1977, when Elaine was thirty-four years old
and Glen was fifty-eight. This was the
second marriage for each, and no children
were born of the marriage. On August 18,
1980, while Elaine was lying on their bed,
Glen shot her in the head at close range
with a .22 caliber rifle.1 He then attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself
under the chin with the same rifle. Approximately seven months later, Glen initiated a divorce action in the Fourth Judicial
District. That case was assigned to Judge
Tibbs, sitting by special appointment.
Elaine counterclaimed for divorce on
grounds that Glen had physically abused
her, leaving her unable to work. Elaine
later filed a personal injury action against
Glen. That case was assigned to Judge
Ballif in the Fourth Judicial District.
Elaine asserted claims based on negligence,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In April of 1983, Judge
Ballif entered partial summary judgment
for Glen, ruling that Elaine's negligence
claim was barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Elaine filed a notice of
intent to appeal the dismissal of her negligence claim and continued to pursue the
intentional tort claims.
The divorce action was tried before
Judge Tibbs on .December 22, 1983, and a
divorce decree in Elaine's favor was entered. In fixing the alimony and the property division, Judge Tibbs expressly took
into account Elaine's increased living expenses and decreased earning ability resulting from the disabilities caused by the
shooting.
Glen then brought a motion for summary
judgment in the tort action pending before
Judge Ballif, arguing that Elaine's intentional tort claims had, in effect, been decided in the divorce action because the alimony and property awards were to some extent intended to compensate for the shooting injuries. Judge Ballif agreed and, relying on the doctrine of res judicata, dismissed Elaine's tort action in its entirety.
the outcome of that criminal action has any
bearing on the divorce and tort claims.
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Glen appeals from the divorce decree.
Elaine appeals from the summary judgment dismissing her tort claims. We will
discuss the two appeals separately, considering first the challenge to the divorce decree and then the attack on the dismissal of
the tort action. At the outset, we emphasize that the issues in these appeals probably would not have arisen and the resolution of both cases would have been greatly
expedited had the tort case been tried before the divorce action. As a general rule,
that is how such cases should be handled,
and it is the course of action that should
have been followed here.2
I. The Divorce Action

[2] In this case, Glen contends that
Judge Tibbs combined the two proceedings
and used the property division and alimony
award as a means of giving Elaine damages properly attributable to her tort
claims. The record does not support this
contention. Judge Tibbs was fully informed that the tort claims were being
tried in a separate action before Judge
Ballif. For that reason, Judge Tibbs stated
in his findings and conclusions that he had
avoided consideration of the merits of the
tort claims qua tort claims, and our review
of the record provides us with no cause to
dispute that assertion. It is true that some
of the facts relevant to the tort claims were
considered in the divorce proceeding, inIn the divorce decree, Judge Tibbs
cluding Elaine's medical and living exawarded Elaine alimony of $750 per month,
penses incurred as a result of the shooting,
the house she brought into the marriage, a
as well as Glen's role in causing her inju$264,000 share of the approximately $800,ries. However, it was not improper to take
000 in assets that Glen brought to the
marriage, and $10,000 in attorney fees.3 those factors into account in the context of
the divorce action. As we explained in
[1] Glen's first argument is that Judge Walther, 709 P.2d at 388 (citing Anderson
Tibbs improperly considered Elaine's tort v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 109, 138 P.2d
claims in the divorce action. We held in 252, 254 (1943)), "[Injuries and attendant
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 medical expenses [caused by a spouse's
(Utah 1985), that it is improper to try a tort tort] may be considered" in deciding the
claim, as such, within a divorce action. Ac- level of need of the other spouse in a
cord Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 divorce proceeding. And because Elaine's
(Utah 1983). Tort claims, which are legal counterclaim for divorce was based on
in nature, should be kept separate from Glen's cruelty to her, it was proper for
divorce actions, which are equitable in na- Judge Tibbs to consider the issue of Glen's
ture. As a practical matter, if spouses fault in causing those injuries. Merely behave tort claims pending against each other cause Judge Tibbs considered facts; relewhich are likely to have a bearing on the vant to the divorce action that were also
outcome of the divorce action, those claims relevant to the tort action does not mean
should be resolved prior to the divorce pro- that he impermissibly adjudicated the tort
ceedings.4
claims in the divorce action.
4. To do otherwise may raise significant concerns if a fact question with respect to which a
party has requested a jury and is entitled to a
jury verdict is first decided by a judge in an
3. Glen now challenges the award of attorney
equitable proceeding. Cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc.
fees. However, he raises this issue for the first
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500. 510-11. 79 S.Ct. 948.
time in his reply brief, contrary to rule 24(c),
956-957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (the federal conRules of the Utah Supreme Court (formerly
stitutional right to a jury trial of legal issues
entitled Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
may be lost through prior judicial determina24(c)). And he provides no reasoning or aution of equitable claims only in the most imperthority to support this claim of error. Thereative circumstances). However, those concerns
fore, we deem any error to have been waived.
See RomreU v. Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P.2d have not been raised by the parties to this case.
1 0 IOC rrit.K io«n\

2. Although that course of action was considered, it was not followed for reasons that are
not entirely clear.
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Glen's second argument, which is something of a variation on the theme of the
first, is that Judge Tibbs abused his discretion in setting the amount of the alimony
award and in dividing the property. He
contends that the award and distribution
were unjustifiably generous to Elaine, particularly in light of the short duration of
the marriage, and that the only explanation
for this generosity is an intent to punish
Glen for the shooting and to compensate
Elaine for her injuries.
[3] We first address Glen's challenge to
the $750-per-month alimony award. We
accord trial courts broad discretion in
awarding alimony so long as the trial court
exercises its discretion "in accordance with
the standards that have beer, set by this
Court" Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
1074 (Utah 1985). We require that a trial
court, in setting alimony, attempt to provide support for the receiving spouse sufficient to maintain that spouse as nearly as
possible at the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. In determining the
amount of the award necessary to accomplish this aim, the trial court must make
adequate findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has considered three
factors: (i) the financial condition and
needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that
party's ability to produce a sufficient income, and (iii) the ability of the other party
to provide support Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d at 1074-75; see Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5 (1984 & Supp.1988). In weighing
those three factors, it is entirely appropriate for the trial court to take into account
whether physical or mental disabilities arising during the marriage, regardless of
their cause, have made the receiving party's needs greater or reduced that party's
ability to produce an income. The fact that
such disabilities may have resulted from
the tortious acts of another, including the
divorcing spouse, certainly does not preclude the trial court from considering those
disabilities. We said as much in Walther,
709 P.2d at 388.

[4] Applying those rules to this case,
the disabilities Elaine suffered as a result
of her injuries at Glen's hands were an
important consideration in assessing the
first two Jones factors—Elaine's financial
condition and needs and her ability to produce an income. Judge Tibbs specifically
found that Elaine had suffered permanent
injuries which left her unemployable, unable to operate a motor vehicle, and "totally and permanently disabled." Evidence
was presented that as a result, Elaine needed approximately $2,600 per month to meet
her expenses. Glen has not challenged
those findings of fact Applying the third
Jones factor, Glen's ability to provide support, the court found that Glen's present
income was insufficient to provide for his
needs and still meet Elaine's needs. It set
alimony at only $750 per month, but also
considered its finding of Elaine's need for
much higher alimony when it fixed the
property division, as will be discussed below.
Judge Tibbs made the required findings
and conclusions demonstrating his consideration of the Jones factors. He quite
properly took into account Elaine's needs
and disabilities resulting from her injuries.
By no stretch of the imagination could the
$750-per-month award be deemed excessive, and we reject Glen's challenge to the
award as meritless.
We next consider Glen's challenge to the
property division. This is a variation on
the argument advanced regarding the alimony award. After finding that Elaine
needed $2,600 per month for expenses and
was unemployable and that Glen could afford only $750 per month in alimony, the
judge also found that because of the difference in the parties' ages, Elaine could be
expected to outlive Glen by some twentyfive years, years during which she would
be without alimony and otherwise unable to
earn an income. In light of these circumstances, the court made what it termed an
"unusual order" awarding Elaine $264,000
of Glen's assets as a means of supplementing the clearly inadequate alimony award
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and ensuring that Elaine would have a
source of support in the future. Before
this Court, Glen argues that in making this
division Judge Tibbs improperly considered
the needs that resulted from Elaine's injuries. He contends that it was error to give
her property she did not bring into the
marriage and that she should have received
only her house and personal effects.
[5^]) We do not lightly disturb a trial
courts division of property in a divorce
decree and will uphold a division made in
accordance with the standards we have set
and in the exercise of the trial court's discretion "except where to do so would work
a manifest injustice or inequity." Pusey v.
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117,119 (Utah 1986); Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah
1983) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d
6, 8 (Utah 1982)). The overarching aim of
a property division, and of the decree of
which it and the alimony award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and
equitable result between the parties. See
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222
(Utah 1980); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1984 & Supp.1988). Stated more specifically, the purpose of property divisions is
to allocate property in the manner which
"best serves the needs of the parties and
best permits them to pursue their separate
lives." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135
(Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at
1074-75. Given this purpose, it is entirely
proper for a trial court making a property
division to consider all the needs of each
spouse, regardless of the cause of the disabilities that give rise to those needs. And,
contrary to Glen's contention, there is no
per se ban on awarding one spouse a portion of the premarital assets of another.
In fact, our cases have consiistently___he]d
that under appropriate circumstances,
achieving a fair, just, and equitable result
may require that the trial court exercise its
discretion to award one spouse^ the premarital property of the other. E.g., Burke, 733
P.2d at 135 (citing Workman v. Workman,
652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982)).
The question then is whether Judge
Tibbs abused his discretion in making the

property division when he took account of
Elaine's need for present and future support and Glen's inability to provide sufficient alimony. We recently explained in
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,
1279 n. 1 (Utah 1987), that the issues of
alimony and property division are not entirely separable.
[N]either the trial court nor this Court
considers the property division in a vacuum. The amount of alimony awarded
and the relative earning capabilities of
the parties are also relevant, because the
relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable determination of
the division of the fixed assets of the
marriage.
Id.; see Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697,
699-700 (Utah 1974). The gross inadequacy of the alimony available to provide for
Elaine's needs, the paucity of her separate
premarital property, and Glen's relative
wealth all warranted Judge Tibbs' awarding Elaine a substantial portion of Glen's
premarital property. We cannot say that
thejunount awarded was excessive under
the circumstances.
[7] Finally, Glen argues that if the divorce decree is allowed to stand and Elaine
is successful in her tort action, she might
receive double compensation for her injuries. We agree that to the extent that the
divorce decree has taken account of disabilities resulting from her injuries by awarding her more alimony or property than she
would have received but for the injuries,
she should not be compensated for those
disabilities again through special damages
in tort In its present form, the divorce
decree does not specify to what precise
extent the alimony and property awards
are based on needs or disabilities arising
from the shooting which could also be the
basis for special damages in tort, such as
lost earning ability and medical expenses.
Therefore, we remand the divorce case to
Judge Tibbs with instructions that he make
findings of sufficient specificity to enable
Judge Ballif to avoid duplicate compensa-
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tion in the tort action. The divorce decree
is affirmed in all other respects.
II. The Tort Actions
Elaine appeals from Judge Ballif s decision dismissing her intentional tort claims
on the basis of the claim preclusion branch
of the doctrine of res judicata.5 And she
argues that if she is allowed to proceed
with that action, Glen should be bound
under the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata by the divorce court's specific finding that he intentionally shot Elaine.

recovering damages. Once proper findings
have been made by Judge Tibbs with respect to the specific elements of loss or
injury considered in making the alimony
and property awards, it will be a simple
matter for Judge Ballif to structure the
tort case so as to avoid duplicate compensation. The claim preclusion ruling was error, and we reverse the grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings on the claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[9] Elaine argues that on remand of the
tort case, Glen should be precluded from
[8] Neither of these arguments re- relitigating the specific finding made in the
quires extensive analysis. The rules of res divorce action that he intentionally shot
judicata and the records in both of these her.6 In Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d
cases fully support Elaine's position. 689, 691 (Utah 1978), we reviewed the rules
Judge Ballif ruled that Elaine's intentional of issue preclusion and listed the elements
tort claims had been litigated and deter- generally accepted to be required if the
mined in the earlier divorce action and were determination of an issue in a preceding
therefore barred under the rules of claim case is to bind the parties in a later case: (i)
preclusion. In Penrod v. Nu Creation the issues must be identical, (ii) the judgCreme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983), ment must be final, (iii) the party estopped
we explained that claim preclusion applies must be a party or in privity with a party
only to claims that actually were or could to the preceding adjudication, and (iv) the
and should have been litigated in the prior issue must have been competently, fully,
action. Tort claims qua tort claims should and fairly litigated. In this case, the parnot be tried as part of a divorce action, ties only dispute whether the second and
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d at 388, and fourth elements have been satisfied.
the record shows that Elaine's tort claims,
There is no merit in Glen's lack-of-finalias such, were not tried. Therefore, claim ty claim, at least at this point Although
preclusion does not bar Elaine from pro- he appealed from the divorce decree, Glen
ceeding on her intentional tort claims and did not challenge the specific finding of
toppel." See the discussions in Penrod v. Nu
5. The doctrine of res judicata has two branches,
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. As the
United Slates Supreme Court has noted, there
1983), Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista
has been a great deal of confusion with respect
Ranch, Inc., 86 Utah Adv.Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App.
to the ^varying and, at tiroes, seemingly conflict1988). and Lane v. Honeywell Inc., 663 F.Supp.
ing terminology" used in discussing the doctrine
370, 371 n. 1, 372 & n. 2 (D.Utah 1987). See
and its two branches, hiigra v. Warren City
generally F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure
School DisL Bd. of Educ., 465 VS. 75, 77 n. 1,
§ 11.3 (3d ed. 1985); C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
104 S.CL 892. 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: JurisMuch confusion has resulted from the use of the
diction § 4402 (1981).
term "res judicata'* to refer to either claim preclusion alone or to the overall doctrine, incorpo- 6. Finding No. eight in the divorce proceeding
rating both claim and issue preclusion. To
reads: "On the late night of the 18th of August
avoid engendering further confusion, we will
1980, plaintiff intentionally and willfully and
use "res judicata" to refer to the overall doctrine
without just cause, shot the defendant Elaine
of the preclusive effects to be given prior judgHans[o]n Noble, in the head with a 22 caliber
ments. We will use the term "claim preclusion"
rifle, thereby causing severe bodily injury to the
to refer to the branch which has often been
defendant"
referred to as "res judicata" or "merger and
bar." And we use the term "issue preclusion" to
refer to the branch often termed "collateral es-
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liability for the shooting. At any rate, our
affirmance of the decree disposes of the
finality issue.
[10] Glen's second argument, that the
issue was not fully and fairly litigated because it was not essential to the divorce
decree, is entirely contrary to the record,
and we reject it as meritless. Section 303-l(3Xg) of the Code provides that cruel
treatment causing bodily injury is grounds
for
divorce.
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 30-3-l(3Xg) (Supp.1988) (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-1(7) (1984)).
Elaine's counterclaim for divorce was
based on Glen's cruelty to her. The issue
of liability for the shooting was raised in
the pleadings, was fully and fairly litigated, and was expressly made the basis for
granting Elaine's counterclaim for divorce.
Throughout the divorce proceeding, Glen
was repeatedly put on notice that issue
preclusion would be asserted against him in
the tort case. As Glen's own memorandum
urging the trial court to dismiss on
grounds of claim preclusion accurately explained, "The key issue to the present tort
action—whether or not an intentional tort
was committed [—] was in fact litigated in
the divorce action
It cannot be disputed that a dominant issue in the divorce
action between these parties was whether
an intentional shooting took place." The
policies behind the doctrine of res judicata
would be ill-served by allowing Glen to
force Elaine to retry this issue.

previous finding of liability for intentionally shooting Elaine.7 After general and special damages have been set, the trial court
is instructed to offset that portion of special damages provided for in the divorce
decree, as shown by the revised findings to
be made by Judge Tibbs. Costs on both
appeals are awarded to Elaine.
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ. ;
and STEWART and DURHAM, J J ,
concur.

Richard A. CHRISTENSON, Trustee for
Cape Trust, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
J. Paul JEWKES and Lorna Jewkes,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 19984.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 25, 1988.

We have considered the remaining arguments and find them to be without merit
The divorce decree is remanded for further
findings but affirmed in all respects. The
summary judgment dismissing Elaine's intentional tort claims is reversed, and those
claims are remanded for further proceedings in which Glen will be bound by the

Creditor brought deficiency judgment
action against debtors after nonjudicial
trust deed sale of undeveloped real property. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., by jury verdict,
entered judgment in favor of debtors.

7. P-l»in» has also appealed from Judge Ballifs
ruling that her negligence claim was barred by
the doctrine of interspousal immunity. She argues that the partial summary judgment was in
error because the common law doctrine was
held to have been abrogated as to negligence
actions in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 ?2d 590 (Utah
1980). In Stoker, this Court held that the doc-

trine had been abrogated with respect to intentional torts. Id. at 590, 592. We have never had
occasion to decide whether this abrogation extended to negligence claims, and we do not do
so in this case. It is unnecessary for us to reach
that question because our disposition of Elaine's
intentional tort action makes it a certainty that
she will have a remedy for her injuries.
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not necessarily binding on the trial court in
its distribution of marital property. Jackson, 617 P.2d at 340.
[14,15] At the time of trial, plaintiff
had already invested $30,000 of the award
proceeds in the National Military Underwriters stock. When plaintiff purchased
the stock, it was valued at its purchase
price, but its current value is unknown.
An in-kind distribution of closely-held corporate stock is appropriate where the evidence fails to establish the stock's value.
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05. The trial
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the
stock and defendant the other half and all
the remaining cash proceeds. It would be
inappropriate, given the speculative nature
of the investment and the fact that defendant has already been awarded the major
income-producing assets, for plaintiff to receive all of the stock and defendant to
receive offsetting property. We further
note that plaintiff was not given an equal
share in the award proceeds from the outset, but only an equal share in the National
Military Underwriters stock, so defendant's
objection to an equal division of the award
proceeds is not well taken. While we do
not condone plaintiffs behavior in awarding herself a pre-trial "distribution" of joint
assets, in view of the entire allocation of
marital assets, we do not find that the trial
court abused its discretion. See Boyle, 735
P.2d at 670-71.

Future Effect of Decree With Respect
to Defendant's Medical Needs
Defendant argues that the trial court did
not look ahead to his future medical needs
in fashioning the decree. Immediately after the decree was entered, defendant filed
a motion to modify, which the court denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been
consistently interpreted to mean that the
trial court has continuing jurisdiction over
the divorce decree with respect to property
distributions, and the decree may be mods' Since thefilingof this appeal, the trial court,
under its continuing jurisdiction, entered a supplemental recommendation and order reducing

ified when there has been a change in the
circumstances or condition of a party since
the entry of the original decree. Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah
1985); Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299,
1300 (Utah 1980).
[16] However, defendant has neither alleged nor proven such changed circumstances, so the trial court did not err m
refusing to modify the decree.2
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm
the trial court's order and award costs to
plaintiff.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.

(O

| UY NUMKR SYSTIM^

Charlotte B. SMITH, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v,
Daniel Harold SMITH, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860252-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1988.
Parties1 marriage was dissolved by the
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don
V. Tibbs, J., and husband appealed from
court's property distribution and alimony
awards. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J.,
held that (1) divorce court order awarding
wife the marital home and all furnishings
and appliances therein and ordering husband to repay mother's purchase-money,
loan was not abuse of discretion, and (2)
award of $425 per month in temporary
alimony was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
the alimony award to $350 per month due to a
reduction in defendant's income.
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1. Divorce «=>235, 252.1, 286(3, 5)
Divorce court has considerable discretion in adjusting financial and property interests of parties, and Court of Appeals
will not disturb court's decision unless it is
clearly unjust or clear abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce «=»240(2), 252.2
Divorce court should distribute property and income to allow parties to readjust
their lives to new circumstances.
3. Divorce *=»252.5(1, 3)
Divorce court order awarding wife the
marital home and all furnishings a ad appliances therein and ordering husband to rei.pay mother's purchase-money loan was not
"abuse of discretion, where wife was; only 14
years old at time of marriage and did not
have high school education, and husband
anticipated earnings of at least $1,450 per
month.
4. Divorce *»211
Divorce court order awarding 16-yearold wife $425 per month in temporary alimony, untfl loans on mobile home and car
were satisfied, was not abuse of discretion,
where wife had not completed high school
and had no vocational or technical training,
and husband anticipated earnings of at
least $1,450 per month.
Benjamin P. Knowlton (argued), Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant
Michael R. Labrum (argued), Labrum &
Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiff and respondent
Before BILLINGS, DAVIDSON and
GARFF, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant husband appeals from the
property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree of divorce. Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff wife properties
partially paid for by his mother and in
ordering him to pay the debts thereon, and
in fixing alimony at $425.00 per month

payable until the debt on a mobile home
and a car were satisfied. He seeks a modification of the decree or, alternatively, to
have the decree reversed and the case remanded. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties were married on July 27
1984. At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was fourteen years of age and still
enrolled in high school. Defendant was
twenty-four years of age. The day following the marriage plaintiff gave birth to the
couple's only child. Plaintiff filed for divorce on January 30, 1986. Defendant's
mother filed a "Notice of Interest" in the
action, claiming ownership or security interests in some of the marital assets.
At trial, plaintiff testified she was employed at a cafe for roughly eight months
during 1985, after which time she was unemployed. During these eight months, she
earned $3,846.00. Plaintiffs only other
employment during the marriage was temporary seasonal work at Escalante Sawmill
for one month prior to the divorce trial at a
monthly salary of $714.00. At the time of
trial, plaintiff had not completed high
school and had no vocational or technical
training. She estimated her minimum
monthly expenses for herself and the child
at $1,161.00, which included the monthly
payments on the automobile and mobile
home.
Defendant worked for Escalante Sawmill
as a "millwright" His 1985 W2 form reflected earnings of $20,302.80. At trial,
defendant testified this amount was unusually high because of an abundance of
overtime. He projected his future income
to be $7.88 per hour, averaging 88 hours
every two weeks, for a total prospective
gross monthly income of approximately
$1,450.00. He estimated his monthly expenses to be between $513.00 and $563.00.
The only evidence adduced at trial regarding the couple's marital assets was an
exhibit, introduced by plaintiff, which listed
the couple's property, the fair market values of each item, the amount of debt, if
any, thereon, and the resulting net values.
Both parties conceded that defendant's
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mother purchased, either by lending the
couple cash or purchasing the items herself
on credit, the parties, mobile home, a washer and the dryer, and a wood burning
stove. Defendant's mother purchased
these assets on the condition that she be
repaid.

constitutes reversible error unless the facts
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted,
and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment" Id. at 1078 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)); Lee, 744 P.2d at 1380.

[3] As stated, the trial court awarded
plaintiff the mobile home; the furnishings
therein, including the washer and dryer,
and wood-burning stove; and a car. Defendant was awarded a 1978 Ford flatbed,
a 1972 Ford pickup, a 1979 Ford Bronco, a
camptrailer, a trailer, a honda motorcycle,
a camper shell, 12 acres of property in
Arizona, guns, mechanic tools, a television,
a stereo, and records. Although the trial
court in its findings did not assign a value
to any asset, according to the only evidence
submitted at trial, plaintiffs apportioned
share of property has a value of $3,500.00
while defendant's has an estimated value
of $15,500.00. Because defendant did not
present any evidence on the value of the
assets, we do not find the trial court's
distribution clearly unjust or a clear abuse
of discretion because the facts in the record
are "clear, uncontroverted, and* capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment" . Gardner,.748-P.2d-at 1078
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987)).
Defendant's primary challenge, to the
Two issues are presented on appeal.
First, did the trial court abuse its discretion property distribution is that the trial court
in distributing the marital assets? Second, awarded plaintiff properties in which his
did the trial court abuse its discretion in mother had an ownership interest We disfixing alimony at $425.00, to be paid until agree with defendant's characterization. Ar
the liens on the mobile home and a car are review of the record clearly indicates that
the parties conceded that defendants mothsatisfied?
er either purchased the assets herself or
lent the parties the money to purchase the
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
assets on the condition that she be repaid,
[1,2] In divorce actions, the trial court
making the mother's interest that of a
has considerable discretion in adjusting the creditor rather than an owner. The court
financial and property interests of the par- acknowledged the mother's interest and deties, Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1878, 1380 (Utah termined the mother should be repaid.
CtApp.1987), and we will not disturb its Consequently, the court ordered defendant
decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear to repay his mother. Given defendant's
abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, earning potential vis-a-vis plaintiffs, we do
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). The trial not find that the trial court's property allocourt should distribute property and in- cation constituted an abuse of discretion.
come to allow the parties to readjust their
lives to their new circumstances. HowALIMONY
l e r , the trial court must make findings on
[4] Defendant also claims the trial
*11 material issues, and its failure to do so court's order to have him pay the $275.00

The trial court awarded plaintiff custody
of the couple's daughter plus child support
in the amount of $170.00 per month. Neither of these determinations is contested.
The court found that plaintiff had an earning capacity of $700.00 per month while
defendant had an earning capacity of
$1,500.00 per month. The court awarded
plaintiff the mobile home; furnishings and
appliances therein, including the washer,
dryer, and wood-burning stove; and a car.
The court ordered plaintiff to satisfy the
liens owing on the mobile home and the
car. Defendant was ordered to pay
$425.00 per month in temporary alimony,
composed of $275.00 per month attributable to the mobile home payment and
$150.00 attributable to the car payment
This $11,000.00 temporary alimony award
is to terminate when these two debts are
satisfied. v Moreover, the court ordered defendant to pay all debts owing to his mother.
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monthly mobDe home payment and the partial $150.00 monthly car payment, as part
of the alimony award, constitutes an abuse
of discretion. We disagree. In the leading
case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,1075
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court delineated three factors that the trial court
must consider in fixing alimony awards: (1)
the financial conditions and needs of the
spouse seeking alimony; (2) the ability of
the spouse seeking alimony to produce sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the
paying spouse to provide support
Plaintiff was 14 years of age when she
and defendant were married. She now has
custody of an infant daughter. She has
^inot completed high school and has no vocational or technical training. Though testimony indicated plaintiff had worked at a
cafe in Escalante and at seasonal employment at Escalante Sawmill, it will be difficult for her to gain employment with a
salary commensurate with her estimated
monthly expenses. By contrast, defendant
is employed by Escalante Sawmill and had
been for three and one-half years prior to
the divorce proceedings. His 1985 earnings were $1,691.83 a month. In the future, he anticipates earning at least
$1,450.00 a month.
Plaintiff estimated her monthly expenses
at $1,161.00 per month, which includes the
monthly mobile home and car payments.
Viewing her future earning potential and
current monthly expenses against that of
defendant convinces us that fixing the
award at $425.00 per month until the loans
on the mobfle home and car are satisfied is
not an abuse of discretion.1
Affirmed.

Costs to Mrs. Smith.

DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Charles R. COX, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870237-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1988.

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
Court, Grand County, Bruce K. Halliday,
J., of unlawful control of vehicle, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
J., held that defendant's subjective knowledge that his taking of automobile was
without owner's permission was not element of joyriding.
Affirmed.

1. Automobiles «=>339
Defendant's subjective knowledge that
his taking of automobile was without owner's permission was not element of joyriding. U.C.A.1953, 41-1-109.
2. Automobiles *=>355(10)
Automobile owner's testimony that
automobile was taken without his knowledge or consent established that defendant
intended to deprive owner of possession as
element of joyriding, despite evidence that
defendant was acquaintance of owner and
had obtained owner's permission to use
automobile on prior occasions. U.C.A.1953,
41-1-109.
3. Criminal Law *=»1038.4, 1173.2(3)
Trial court's failure in joyriding prosecution to instruct jury that it was free to
find automobile owner's implied consent
for defendant to use automobile in light of

1. The Utah Supreme Court has Indicated that
rircumstanccs similar to these may be diffident
to support an award of permanent spousal support. Olson v. Olson, 704 ?2d 564, 567 (Utah

1985); see Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 102
(Utah 1986). However, since the wife did not
raise the duration of the alimony award on
appeal, we do not consider it
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Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v

Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
No. 18089.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.

/Whether right to benefit or asset has ac/ crued in whole or in part during marriage
/ and, to extent that right has so accrued, i1
\ j s subject to equitable distribution
4. Divorce *=>2523(4)
In divorce proceeding, trial court properly awarded wife one-half share in that
portion of husband's government retirement benefits to which rights accrued during^ marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to any such benefits
until and unless he worked additional 15
years at government job.

The First District Court^ Box Elder
County, VeNoy ChristoffersenT"^ granted
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
divorce witlTproperty""3ivision, and husband
"-~"
Where husband's right to retirement
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., /
_benefits
was contingent upon his working
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded!
an
additional
15 years, tml_ court propeifly
wife share in that portion of husband's!
awarded
wife
share
in such benefits in form
retirement benefits to which rights accrued)
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-1 oi deferred distribution based upon fixed

band was not entitled to such benefits untif—-*^^n^a^ehe worked additional 15 years, and (2)
award of such benefits was properly made
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff,
in form of deferred distribution based upon appellant and cross-respondent.
fixed percentage.
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for deAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and fendant, respondent and cross-appellant
remanded.
1. Divorce *=>252.3(4)
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and
pension rights is inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject
, to equitable division in divorce proceeding.
2. Divorce «=> 252.3(1, 4)
- In fashioning equitable property division in divorce proceeding, court may take
linto consideration all pertinent circumstancjes, encompassing all assets of every nature
possessed by parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source deriyed,_and_ including retirement and pension rights;
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d
839.
3. Divorce «=> 252.3(1)
Whether resource is subject to distribu^
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on
whether spouse can presently use or control
it, or on whether resource can be given
present dollar value; essential criterion is

DURHAM, Justice:
The plaintiff husband appeals from that
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce
which awarded to the defendant wife a
portion of his retirement benefits. The
husband argues that the court erred in considering, as a marital asset, that portion _of
his pension which would be contributed by
the government at some future date.
The husband has worked as a civilian
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen
years. Under his government pension plan,
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension
fund dunng that time. If he were to leave
hisjob now, he woulcTreceive only the
amount of his contr^^ior^s.~"rirorder' to
receive "maximum benefits from_the plan,
thejiusband woul^hjivejojmrticipate in it
for a total of 30 yeajs^ At that time, the
government would match the amount of his
contributions and the husband could elect to
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial

432

Utah

656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

court stated that, because one-half of the not the pension rights are "vested or non30-year period occurred during the mar- y^^arrEngtert
v. Englert. UtahHs76
riage and because the wife is entitled to i R2d 1274(1978), we emphasized the equitaone-half of the amount accrued during that > ble nature of proceedings dealing with the
time, the wife was therefore "granted an \ family, pointing out that the court may
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds take into consideration all of the pertinent
which the [husband] receives on his retire- circumstances
These circumstances enmerrt account, to be paid to Tthe wife]
compass "all of the assets of every nature
^ ffi% husband]^receives the proceeds " ' possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
The ntisbaftdxofieeaes that the wife is enti- Ijnd^from" whatever source derivedLand
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut- ' that this includes any such pension fund or
ed during the fifteen years of their mar- 1 insurance/' Id at 1276. To the extent that
riage. However, he^claims that she has no Bennett v Bennett, supra, may limit the
right or interest in the amount to be con- [ability of the court to consider all of the
tributed by the government at the time of "parties' assets and circumstances, including
Kis~retirement becauseJthat_amQunt is con- retirement and pension rights, it is expresstingent upon his continued government em- ly overruled
ployfnent
~
^
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar[1,2] The only authority cited by the gues that because he cannot now benefit
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben- from the government's promised contribunett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that tions to his pension at the time of retirecase, this Court reversed a trial court's divi- ment, the wife should not receive any porsion of the husband's retirement benefits tion of the benefits which are based on the
because the government's future contribu.- government's participation. This argument
tion to the retirement fund was found to faiis to recognize that pension or retirement
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How- benefits aj-e a form of deferred compensaever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 tion by the employer.. If the rights to those
(1982), we commented that "that holding benefits are acquired during the marriage,
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife then the court must, at least consider those
urges the adoption of the position taken by benefits in making an equitable distribution
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar- of the marital assets. "JThe rierht to reriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, ceivemonies in the future is unquestionably
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). fhere the court' ^ an economic resource' subject to equitaheld that "[p}ension rights, whether or not ble distribution based upon proner computavested, represent a property interest; to tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v.
the extent that such rights derive from' Kikkert, 111 NJ.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d
employment during coverture, they com- 76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in origprise a community asset subject to division inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J.
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 464, 4G8, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), affd, 88
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case over- NJ. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that
ruled an earlier California case of long- resource is suhiect to distribution doesjiot
standing which had distinguished pension turn on whether_the_spoyse_can preienHy
n
rights on the basis of whether the rights use or control ik.Qr_g whether thj resource
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we can be^giveji^4)res€nt_ dollar value. ~TKe
find it unnecessary to consider whether or Essential criterion is.whetheiCajnght^ tojhe
1. In Stem v. Stern, 66 NJ. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975), the court commented that "the concept
of vesting should probably find no significant
place in the developing law of equitable distribution." /d at 348,331 A.2dat262. The court
refers briefly to the origins of the vested interest as it was associated with the concept of

seisin and also to its use in connection with
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional
guaranties. We agree that this concept of
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject to equitable division in a divorce proceeding.
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mefit or asset has accrued in whote or in cult if not impossible to ascertain because
trt during the marriage^ To the extent^^the value of the benefits is contingent on
iat"lfee"right has so'accrued it is subject ta the husband's decision to remain working
for the government In such a case, "the
[uitable distribution.
141 In the instant case, the "husband traAtty&yltsft\d \*s& ^ Tpfc<iVrt>d ^ridfcfy %YT>ust work for another fifteen years to ployed in other states, whereby the trial
lalify for the maximum benefits under court determines what percentage o f the
le pension plan. He will not qualify in the niarital property each spouse is to receive,
yenty-ninth year or in the next to the last and then divides payments from the pension
onth. Because he must work for a total plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90
' thirty years, his pension benefits, includ- Wis^d 1, 10, 280 N.WJ2d 293, 298 (1979).
g any contribution by the government, The Wisconsin court continued:
Under this approach it is unnecessary to
•e as dependent on the first fifteen years
make
any determination as to the value
; the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is entiof the pension fund.... When the benesd to share in that portion of the benefits
ficiary spouse then opts to receive paywhich the rights accrued during the marments under the pension plan, the nonage. We hold that the trial court did not
covered spouse would be entitled to her
r in making equitable distribution of the
lsband's retirement benefits.
established percentage of those payments
Any risk associated with the
[5] We also hold that the method used
fund
.
.
.
would
be by this method appordistribute the retirement benefits was a
tioned
equally
between
the parties. This
•oper exercise of the court's discretion.
method
may
[sic]
particularly
appropriate
r
e agree with the discussion in Kikkert,
where
tfte
"presenT^alue
of
a pension
ipra, where it was stated:
fund
is
very
difficult
or
impossible
to
Umfc-tetm axvd deferred *tarmg ol fvuMxassess.
cial interests are obviously too susceptible
to continued strife and hostility, circum* Id at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes
stances which our courts traditionally omitted).
strive to avoid to the greatest extent
The trial court awarded one-half of the
possible. This goal may be best accom- marital property to each of the parties in
plished, if a present value of the pension the instant case. It is clear that the court
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other intended the wife to receive one-half of the
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all retirement benefits which had accrued durappropriate considerations, including the ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in
length of time the pensioner must survive its order, the court specified that the wife
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the
other assets leaving all pension benefits retirement plan as they are received by the
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards
to the employee himself.
On the other hand, where other assets. to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued
for equitable distribution are inadequate. during the marriage only if the husband
or lacking altogether, or where ncL works for the full thirty years. The order
present value can be establish ftfld t^(L should be modified to provide for the wife
parties are unable to reach agreem^^t. to receive one-half of the benefits accrued
resort must be had to a form of deferred. during the marriage, regardless of the'
distribution based upon fixed percent* length of time the husband continues in the
same employment 'Whenever the husband
ages^
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-S0. The facts in chooses to terminate his government emthe present case present just such a circum* ployment, the marital property subject to
stance: other assets available for equitable distribution is a portion of the retirement
distribution are inadequate, and a present benefits represented by the number of
value of retirement benefits would be diffi- years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.

Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen,
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v,
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of Utah.

1. Appeal and Error «=»430(1)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court
lacks, jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment $=181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment *=>185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resolved in favor of opposing party on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.

Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross
claims with prejudice except for claim
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city
streets in safe condition was question of
fact for jury, precluding summary judgment
Reversed and remanded for trial.

5. Judgment *=>180
Summary judgment is appropriate only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
6. Municipal Corporations *=> 757(1)
City has nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations *=»798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to
maintain streets^ it is necessary for cities to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe,
visible and working condition.
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§ 1056. Form and payment of benefits
(a) Commencement date for payment of benefits

Each pension plan shall provide that unless the participant otherwise elects, thi
payment of benefits under the plan to the participant shall begin not later than th<
60th day after the latest of the close of the plan year in which—
(1) occurs the date on which the participant attains the earlier of age 65 o
the normal retirement age specified under the plan,
(2) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which the participant com
menced participation in the plan, or
(3) the participant terminates his service with the employer.
In the case of a plan which provides for the payment of an early retirement benefil
such plan shall provide that a participant who satisfied the service requirements fo
such early retirement benefit, but separated from the service (with any nonforfeil
able right to an accrued benefit) before satisfying the age requirement for sue!
early retirement benefit, is entitled upon satisfaction of such age requirement t
receive a benefit not less than the benefit to which he would be entitled at th
normal retirement age, actuarially reduced under regulations prescribed by th
Secretary of the Treasury.
(b) Decrease in plan benefits by reason of increases in T>enefit levels under Social Securit.
Act or Railroad Retirement Act of 1937

If—
(1) a participant or beneficiary is receiving benefits under a pension plan, o
(2) a participant is separated from the service and has nonforfeitable rights t
benefits,
a plan may not decrease benefits of such a participant by reason of any increase ii
the benefit levels payable under title II of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 40
et seq.] or the Ejailroad Retirement Act of 1937 [45 U.S.C.A. § 231 et seq.], oran;
increase in the Wage base under such title II, if such increase takes'place, afte
September 2, 1974, or (if later) the earlier of the date of first entitlement of sue!
benefits or the date of such separation.
(c) Forfeiture of accrued benefits derived from employer contributions '

No pension plan may provide that any part of & participant's, accrued benef
derived from employer contributions (whether or not otherwise nonforfeitable) i
forfeitable solely because of withdrawal by such participant of any amount attribute
ble to the benefit derived from contributions made by such participant Th
preceding sentence shall not apply (1) to the accrued benefit of any participan
unless, at the time of such withdrawal, such participant has a nonforfeitable right t
at least 50 percent of such accrued benefit, or (2) to the extent that an accrue
benefit is permitted to be forfeited in accordance with section 1053(aX3XDXiii) of thi
title.
(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits

(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may nc
be assigned or alienated.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be take
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 percent c
any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefit
executed before September 2, 1974. The preceding'sentence shall not apply to an
assignment or alienation made for the purposes of defraying plan administratio
costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant or beneficiar
shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by th
participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed b
section 4975 of Title 26 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason (
section 4975(dXl) of Title 26.
OKA) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or "recognition ~bf
right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to. a domest
relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the^order is determine
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to be a qualified domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the
payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified
domestic relations order.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic relations
order—
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right
to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of
the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D)
are met, and
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order
(including approval of a property settlement agreement) which—
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a
participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a
community property law).
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only
if such order clearly specifies—
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant
and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order,
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the
plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or
percentage is to be determined,
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and
(Iv) each plan to which such order applies.
(D) A domestic relations order meets the reauirements of (this subparagraph only
if such order'—
(i) does not require a plan to provide any tyDe or form of benefit or any
option, not otherwise Provided under the Dlan.
(ii), does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the
basis of actuarial value), and
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which are
required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously
determined to l>e a qualified domestic relations order.
(E)(i) A domestic relations order shall not be treated Jas failing to meet the
requirements of clause (i) of subparagraph (D) solely because such order requires
that payment of benefits be made to an alternate payee—
(I) in the case of any payment before a participant has separated from
service, on or after the date on which the participant attains (or would have
attained) the earliest retirement age,
(II) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such payment is to
begin under such order (but taking into account only the present value of
benefits actually accrued and not taking into account the present value of any
employer subsidy for early retirement), and
(III) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to the
participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity with respect
to the alternate payee and his or her subsequent spouse).
For purposes of subclause (II), the interest rate assumption used in determining the
present value shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate is specified,
5 percent
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "earliest retirement age" means
the earlier of—
(I) the date on which the participant is entitled to a distribution under the
plan, or
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(II) the later of the date of the participant attains age 50 or the earliest date
on which the participant could begin receiving benefits under the plan if the
participant separated from service.
(F) To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order—
(i) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving spouse of
such participant for purposes of section 1055 (and any spouse of the participant
shall not be treated as a spouse of the participant for such purposes) of this title,
and
(ii) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving former spouse shall be treated
as meeting the requirements of section 1055(f) of this title.
(G)(i) In the case of any domestic relations order received by a plan—
(I) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and each
alternate pavee of the receipt of such order and the plan's procedures for
determining the qualified status of domestic relations orders, and
(II) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan administrator shall determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order
and notify the participant and each alternate payee of such determination.
(ii) Each plan shall establish reasonable procedures to determine the qualified
status of domestic relations orders and to administer distributions under such
qualified orders. Such procedures—
(I) shall be in writing,
(II) shall provide for the notification of each person specified in a domestic
relations order as entitled to payment of benefits under the plan (at the address
included in the domestic relations order) of such procedures promptly upon
receipt by the plan of the domestic relations order, and
(III) shall permit an alternate payee to designate a representative for receipt
of copies of notices that are sent to the alternate payee with respect to a
domestic relations order.
(H)(i) During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic relations order
is a qualified domestic relations order is being determined (by the plan administrator,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise), the plan administrator shall
separately account for the amounts (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as
the "segregated amounts") which would have been payable to the alternate payee
during such period if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic
relations order.
(ii) If within the 18-riionth period described in clause (v) the order (or modification
thereof) is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (including any interest thereon) to the person
or persons entitled thereto,
(iii) If within 18-month period described in clause (v)
(I) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations order,
or
(II) the Issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order
is not resohed,
then the plan ad Tin is tra tor shall pay the segregated amounts (including any interest
thereon) to the person or persons who v,ould have been entitled to such amounts if
there had been no.order.
(iv) Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations order which
is made after the close of the 18-month period described in clause (v) shall be applied
prospectively only.
(v) For purposes of this subparagraph, the 18-month period described in this
clause is the 18-month period beginning with the date on which the first payment
would be required to be made under the domestic relations order.
(I) If a plan fiduciary acts in accordance with part 4 of this subtitle in—
(i) treating a domestic relations order as being (or not being) a qualified
domestic relations order, or
(ii) taking action under subparagraph (H),
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then the plan's obligation to the participant and each alternate payee shall be
discharged lo the extent of any payment made pursuant to such Act
(J) A person who is an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order
shall be considered for purposes of any provision of this chapter a beneficiary under
the plan. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall permit a requirement under
section 1301 of this title of the payment of more than 1 premium with respect to a
participant for any period.
(K) The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, former spouse, child, or other
dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having
a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect
to such participant
(L) This paragraph shall not apply to any plan to which paragraph (1) does not
apply.
(M) Payment of benefits by a pension plan in accordance with the applicable
requirements of a qualified domestic relations order shall not be treated as garnishment for purposes of section 303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(N) In prescribing regulations under this paragraph, the Secretary shall consult
w ith the Secretary of the Treasury.
(Pub L 93-406, Title I, § 206, Sept 2, 1974, 88 Stat 864, Pub L 98-397, Title I, § 104(a), Aug
23, 1984, 98 Stat 1433, Pub L 99-514, Title XVIII, § 1898(cX2KB), (4KB), (5), (6KB), (7KB), 100
Stat 2952-2954, PubL. 101-239, Title VII, §§ 7891(a)(1), 7894(cK8), (9XA), Dec 19, 1989, 103
Stat 2445, 2449.)

Historical and Statutory Notes

shall Lake effect as if included in section 104 of the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 [amending this
section]"

References in Text The words "this chapter",
referred to in subsec (dX3)(I), w^re in the original
"such Act", meaning Pub L 93-406, as amended,
knov.n as the Employee Retirement Income Secunt> Act of 1974. Titles I, III, and IV of such
Act are classified principally to this chapter For
complete classification of this Act to the Code, see
Short Title note set out under section 1001 of this
title and Tables volume.
1989 Amendment Subsec (aXl)
PubL
101-239, § 7894{cX8), substituted "occurs the
date" for "the date*!.
Subsec (dX2). Pub.L 101-239. $ 7891(*X1),
substituted "section 4975 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986" for -section 4975 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 19$4**J which for purposes of
codification was translated as "section 4975 of
Title 26", thus requiring no change in text, and
also for purposes of codification, "section
4975(dXl) of such Code" was translated as "section 4975(dXl) of Tide 26".
Swbsec
" (dX3XI> PubL.
101-239,
§ "i94(cX9XA), substituted "such Act" for "such
act codified as "this chapter" Sec References
in Text note set out under this section
Effective Date of 1989 Amendment Amendment by section 7891 of Pub L 101-239 effective,
except as otherwise provided, as if included in the
prevision of Pub L 99-514 to which such amendment relates, see section 7891(0 of PubL
101-239, set out as a note under section 1002 of

Effective Date of 1986 Amendment Amendment by section 1898(cX2XB), (4XB), (5), (6XB).
(7XB) of Pub L 99-514 to take effect as if included in the provision of the Retirement Equity Act
of 1984 to which such amendment relates, except
as otherwise provided, see section 18980) of
Pub L 99-514, set out as a note under section 401
of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Legislative History. For legislative history and
purpose of P u b L 99-514, see 1986 U.S Code
Cong and Adm. News, p. 4075. See, also, Pub L
101-239 Wft9 tf-S.Ovfc Crmo ami A H m N m . n.
1906.

Law Review Commentaries
Applying Louisiana's community property principles to pensions. Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, 33
Lovola (La.) LRev 241 (1987)
ERISA-Exoeptions to the anti-alienation provision Strengthening ERISA's protection through
a fraud amendment Comment 10 W.New Eng.
LRev 317 (1988)
ERISA retirement plans in individual bankruptcy John Minton Newell, 19 U Mich J L Ref 183
(1985)
Exempting retirement benefits from bankruptcy
in Colorado Chuck Schlosser, 18 Colo Law 17
(1989)
Kansas enacts new provisions for child support
enforcement—mandatory *age withholding 25
Washburn LJ 91 (1985)
Multi-junsdictjonal analysis of plan exemptions.
Andrew J. Klein, 42 J of Mo B 477 (1986)
Qualified domestic relations orders' A statutory
analysis. Howard A Massler, 19 Seton Hall
LRev. 224 (1989)

this title.

Amendment by section 7894{cX8) of PubL
101-239 effective as if originally included in the
provision of Pub L 95-406 to which such amendment relates, see section 7894<i) of PubL
101-239, set out as a note under section 1002 of
this title.

Section 7894<cX9XB) of Pub L 101-239 provided that "The amendment made by subparagraph
(A) [amending subsec (dX3XD of this section]

Qualified retirement plan benefits—Does
ERISA's anti-alienation provision protect them
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from bankruptcy court attachment? 62 U.Det.L.
Rev. 109 (1984).
The division oi pension benelits m divorce.
Sheppard F. Micrs, Jr., Thomas J. St. Ville, and
G. Samuel Schaunaman, II, 57 Okl.B.J. 2601
(1986).

Notes of Decisions
Assignment or alienation of benefits
Constructs e trust 21a
Employee pension plans 20a
Severance agreement for disability benefits
24

4.

Prohibition on assignment or alienation
of benefits
Purpose of ERISA's proscription on alienation
and assignment is to protect an employee from his
own financial improvidence in dealing with third
parties; provision is not intended to alter traditional support obligations, but rather to assure
that the employee and his beneficiaries reap the
ultimate benefits due upon retirement. Stinner v.
Stinner, Pa 1989, 554 A.2d 45.
6.

Law governing

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
did not apply to a case in which the disputed sums
were not benefits under the protection of an
ERISA plan, benefits had been distributed in a
lump sum and therefore recipient was no longer
"entitled to a benefit" under ERISA. Clark v.
Superior Court for Dist. of Columbia, C.A D C
)990, 905 R2d 189.
7.

State regulation or control

Missouri statute providing for bankruptcy exemption of property exempt from attachment and
execution under Missouri or federal law could not
and did not create ERISA exemption on theory
ERISA antialienation provisions constitute federal
law exempting property from attachment and execution; ERISA preempts state law. In re Gaines,
Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.l989,<106B.R. 1008.
11. Commencement date of payment-^Generally
Employee Retirement Income Security Act section designed to protect participant's right to benefits by establishing age 65 as latest possible trigger date for payment of benefits, while leaving
employer free to set earlier date under its plan, did
not give agent as participant right to enforce
payment of benefits under deferred compensation
plan before reaching age 65. Wolcott v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., S.D.Ohio 1987, 664 F.Supp.
1533, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other
grounds 884 F.2d 245.
13. Lump-sum payment
Where bank employee presented no evidence
that he had made personal contributions to employee pension plan at time such contributions
were allowed, provision of pension plan established under Employee Retirement Income Security Act which gave contributor participants rights
to receive those employee contributions, plus interest, in lump-sum at retirement did not support
lump-sum payment to bank employee of all his
pension benefits, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4U(cX2XQ;

LABOR
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. § 204(cX2XQ, as amended, 29 U.$.C.A.
Denton v. First Nat. Bank of Waco, Texas. CA.5
(Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1295.
14.

Payment of early retirement benefit—Generally
Early retirement provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 did not
apply to ^M pension plan which provides benefits
to employees, who have had their service to the
company interrupted or are otherwise absent from
work by reason of plant shutdown, lay-off, or
disability; plan contains conditions other than age
and service for benefit accrual. Roper v. Pullman
Standard. C.A.I 1 (Ala.) 1988, 859 F.2d 1472.
ERISA provision setting forth requirements
that must be met should plan provide for early
retirement benefits does not confer upon plan
participants any substantive right to continued
employment in order to qualify for earlier retirement benefits. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., GA. 11
(Ala.) 1986, 799 F.2d 1464, certiorari denied 107
S.Ct. 1893, 481 U.S. 1016, 95 L.Ed.2d 500.
Employee who was not yet 65 could not compel
payment of pension benefits under ERISA-qualified plan that did not provide for early retirement
or for distribution of benefits at ealier date, notwithstanding that benefits might already have
vested. First Atlantic Leasing Corp. v. Tracey,
D.N J. 1990, 738 F.Supp. 863.
Employees' retirement applications were not offers to retire subject to withdrawal by employees,
rather retirement applications constituted employ*
ees' decision to invoke rights earned in course of
their years of employment, and thus date of retirement was determined not by formal acceptance of
application, but by date employees ceased working
so that employees who retired prior to effective
date of more lucrative special retirement plan
were not eligible for participation in plan. Muscar v. ARCO Chemical Ca.-Dtv.- of AtlanticRichfield Co., W. D.Pa. 1986,; 651. ;F.Supp._ 864.
Pension plan, -which offered fully vested termi*
nated employees'with 20 or more years of service' *
actuarially ^reduced normal' retiretnent benefits* j
commencing at age 60/rcV>mpued with ERISA^
requirements. Moehle v.'NL" Industries, Inc.,
E.D.Mo.1986. 646 F.SUDD.769. affirmed 845 F.2d
1027.
No specific mode of pension rplan payment is
required by Employee Retirement Income Security Act; at most, ERISA provides that if an
optional plan is ofTered, it be the actuarial equivalent of what the participant would have received
under the regular retirement age. Prusak v. Bethlehem 1980 Salaried Pension Plan, D.C.N.Y.1984,
618 F.Supp. 530.
15.
Lump-sum payment
Pension plan providing that pension committee
"may" direct a lump-sum payment, if vested benefit uas less than $1,750 or member agreed in
vrriting, conferred no rights upon employees terminated because of plant closing to receive lumpsum payments rather than annuities. Wilson v.
Mid-South Foundry, Inc. E.D.Ark.1987, 660
F.Supp. 267.
Oil company, by selling its liquid propane gas
division, did not violate section of ERISA relating
to early retirement benefits, [Employee Retire-
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Note 20a
ment* Income Security Act of 1974, §$ 206,
206(a), 29 U.S.GA1 §§ 1056, 1056(a)] where com.
pany's retirement plan gave terminated employees
option to receive actuarially reduced benefits immediately upon their termination rather than requiring that terminated employees attain early
retirement age specified in the plan before receiving vested early retirement benefits, and division
employees who were vested under the plan elected
that option and received such payments. Phillips
v. Amoco Oil Co., D.C.Ala. 1985, 614 F.Supp.
694, affirmed 799 F.2d 1464, certiorari denied 107
S.Ct. 1893. 481 U.S. 1016, 95 L.Ed.2d 500.
17. Assignment or alienation of benefits—Generally
California Franchise Tax Board's income tax
levy procedure with respect to retirement trust
was prohibited by ERISA's antialienation provision. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing v.
Franchise Tax Bd., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 909 F.2d
1266.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act provision prohibiting assignment of pension benefits
did not apply to assignment of medical and disability benefits. Wisconsin Dcpt. of Health and
Social Services v. Upholsterers Intern. Union
Health and Welfare Fund, W.D.Wis. 1988, 686
F.Supp. 708.
Nonforfeiture and alienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act precluded
employer from withholding employee's vested
pension benefits due to employee's alleged misconduct Crausman v. Curtis-Wnght Corp., D.N.J.
1988, 676 F.Supp. 1302.
ERISA's antialienation provision applies only to
pension plans and does not cover welfare plans,
including health and welfare trust fund and vacation and savings trust fund. Arizona Laborers,
Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension Trust Fund v. NeVarez. D.Ariz. 1987. 661
F.SUD0. 365.
18. *"
Alimony and family support
Because of different'circumstances in which
Qualified Domestic Relations Order may prove
necessary m'order for pension benefits to be assigned or alienated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, it is not essential that
such onJer be part of judgment in action; party
otherwise entitled to QDRO may obtain one as
aid to enforcing previously entered judgment.
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 'Md.1989, 566 A.2d 767.
Order entered in enforcement of property settlement agreement, which contained a provision for
payment of alimony to wife until death or remarriage, was a "qualified domestic relations order**
within meaning of exception to antialienation provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and thus former wife could garnish former
husband's pension to satisfy order, order was not
based solely on contract but on the decisional
domestic relations law of Pennsylvania. Sttnner
v Stinner, Pa.1989, 554 A.2d 45.
19.
Attachment
Funds held by custodian of Individual Retirement Accounts, established by judgment debtor,
were neither preempted nor exempted from attachment by judgment creditor in view of the fact
that IRA was not qualified pension plan or bene-

fit. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical'Center
v. PrendergasV 1986, 509 N.Y.S.2d 697, 134
Misc.2d93.
' ''
' ~
Ohio statute authorizing the withholding of any
form of income for payment of alimony constituted **state domestic relations law," within meaning
of federal statute requiring that any attachment of
benefits payable under pension plan qualifying
under Employee Retirement Income Security Act
be made pursuant to "state domestic relations
law." Taylor v. Taylor, Ohio 1989, 541 N.E2d
55.
ERISA does not prohibit assignment of health
care benefits or limit the class of persons a participant is permitted to designate to receive benefits
under health plan. Kennedy v. Deere & Co.,
1987, 514 N.E2d 171, 112 Ill.Dec. 705, 118 IU.2d
69, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct 1024, 484 U.S.
1064, 98 L.Ed.2d 989.
Under federal law, individual retirement account is not exempt from levy or attachment by
judgment creditor, Congress specifically excluded
IRA's from antialienation protection of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act Rowland v. Strickland, App.1987, 362 S.E.2d 892, 294
S.C 119.
20.
Bankruptcy
In re McLean, 41 B.R. 893 [main volume]
reversed 762 F.2d 1204.
ERISA plans containing antialienation clauses
are not excluded from bankruptcy estate, under
statute making restriction on transfer of beneficial
interest of debtor in trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law enforceable in
bankruptcy case, by operation of ERISA itself,
but ERISA plans may be excluded from bankruptcy estate under that statute if they qualify as
enforceable spendthrift trusts under applicable
state law. • In re Boon, W.D.Mo.1989, 108 B.R.
697/
. Where ERISA pension plan assets were included in debtors* bankruptcy estates and were not
exempt, trustees could administer assets for benefit of creditors; antiasslgnment and antialienadoo
requirements of ERISA andf Interna^ jRevenue
Code did not create separate basis upon which
pension plan funds were placed beyond reach of
trustee, "In re Flindall. Bkrtcy.D.Ariz. 1989, 105
B.R. 32."
20a.
Employee pension plans
Antialienation provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) precluded
offset against participant's pension interest in plan
covered by ERISA of judgment based on participant's breaches of duty as trustee to same plan.
Herberger v. Shanbaum, CA.5 (Tex.) 1990, 897
F.2d 801.
Controversy between good-faith adverse claimants as to pension benefits is subject to settlement
like any other controversy and assignment made
pursuant to bona fide settlement of such a controversy is not invalidated by the antialienation provisions of ERISA or of the Internal Revenue
Code. Stobnicki v. Textron, Inc., CA.5 (Tex.)
1989, 868 F.2d 1460.
Pension plan covered under Employee Retirement Income Security Act could not set off vested
benefits owed by nonfiduciary who was found to
have participated in a breach of trust and jointly
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liable for damages which the plan thereby incurred; vested benefits of plan could not be assigned or alienated, particularly in light of nonfiduciary's lack of criminal action or fraud during
the breach, and the equities of the case.
McLaughlin v. Lindcmann, CA.5 (Tex.) 1988,
853 F.2d 1307.
Notwithstanding antialicnation provisions of
ERISA, court could offset participants' interests
in plan covered by ERISA against judgment based
on participants' breaches of duty in their capacity
as trustees to same plan. Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 1987, 815 F.2d 117, 259 U.S.
App.D.C. 279, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 328,
735, 98 L Ed.2d 355, 683.
Antialienation provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A
§ 1056(d), prohibited employer from reclaiming,
through imposition of constructive trust under
state common-law principles of equity, funds contributed to employee's pension plans while employer was unaware that those funds represented
monies derived from fraudulent practices for
which employee was subsequently indicted and
convicted and for which employer effectively became liable to defrauded customers, Ellis Nat.
Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., C.A.2
(N.Y.) 1986, 786 F.2d 466.
Where Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
obtained judgment against plan fiduciary for
breaches of his fiduciary duties in connection with
his alleged failure to forward employee and employer contributions to plan, fiduciary's claim to
benefits could be set off against judgment; such
setoff would not violate ERISA's antialienation
provision. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, E.D.N.Y.1990, 743 F.Supp. 125.
Equitable offset remedy, by which pension plan
beneficiary's liability to plan for losses suffered by
plan as a result of beneficiary's misconduct with
fiduciary is offset against his payments from plan,
is available as against nonfiduciary who is directly
and severally liable for knowing participation in
fiduciary's breachl' Brock v. Lindemann, N.D.
Tcxil987. 689 FSupp. 678.
21a/

Constructive trust

Remedial provision of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act did not override-Employee Retirement Income Security Act's prohibition on alienation of pension benefits so as to
allow court to place constructive trust in favor of
union on former union official's pension benefits
after official was convicted of embezzling funds
from union. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat
Pension Fund CrAn. loon n n S Ct MCI 107
L.Ed.2d 781
ERISA's antialienation provision did not prevent imposition of constructive trust on pension
benefits owing to union official who was found
guilty of embezzlement from union. Guidry v.

National Sheet' Metal Workers* Nat Pensidtf
Fund, D.Colo.1986, 641 RSupp. 360. affirm^
856 F.2d 1457.
22.

Garnishment

Judgment creditor could not garnish or attach
proceeds of ERISA-qualified pension plan, even
though plan was terminating and judgment debt>4
ors plan participants were scheduled to receive
lump-sum payment prior to retirement. Travelers
Ins. Companies v. Fountain City Federal Credit
Union, C.A.I 1 (Ala.) 1989, 889 F.2d 264.
23.

Marital asset distribution

State court divorce decree order pursuant to
which one spouse waives any interest in other
spouse's ERISA-qualified pension plan can affect
payment of benefits under plan, even though employee-spouse does not change designation of beneficiary prior to his or her death Fox Valley &
Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown,
C.A.7 (111.) 1990, 897 F.2d 275.
Under Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, divorced wife, who was designated as lumpsum death benefit beneficiary according to terms
of former husband's pension before divorce, could
not receive lump-sum death benefits, where divorce settlement agreement contained mutual
waiver of parties' rights to each other's pension
benefits. Fox Valley and Vicinity Const Workers
Pension Fund v. Brown, N.D.IH.19SS, 684
F.Supp. 185.
Because group life policy was part of an employee welfare plan and not a pension plan, divorce decree provision that wife be retained as the
beneficiary was not a qualified domestic relation
order and the antialienation provision of ERISA
did not apply. Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co, D.Kan.1989, 727 RSupp. 592.
y

A union retirement and benefits plan funded
only by contributions from employees was a
"trust" exempt from taxation and was not subject
to domestic relations ^order exception to ERISA
antialienation. and^preemption provisions; thus,
the fund was not required to comply" with state
court orders directing it to pay ex-spouses a portion of their former husband's retirement monies.
Inter-Local Pension Fund of Graphic Communications Intern. Union v. Gill, ND.I1U989, 723
RSupp. 1254.
24.

Severance
benefits

agreement

for

disability

Antialienation provision in Employee Retirement Income Security Act did not preclude employee from entering into severance agreement
which relinquished his rights to long-term disability benefits under his employer's disability plans.
Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., C A 7 (UL)
1989. 889 R2d 115.

§ 1058. Mergers and consolidations of plans or transfers of plan assets
Notes of Decisions
Benefits included
Transfers 3

3.

Transfers
Spin-off of retirement plan from former employer's plan to plant purchaser occurred when purchaser's employees began accruing benefits under
new plan, when one major calculation of transfer
amount was made, and when interest accrued on
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(i) such plan is a money purchase pension plan with a nonintegrated
employer contribution rate for each participant of at least 10 percent of
compensation,
(ii) such plan provides for full and immediate vesting, and
(iii) each employee of the leasing organization (other than employees
who perform substantially all of their services for the leasing organization) immediately participates in such plan.
Clause (iii) shall not apply to any individual whose compensation from the
leasing organization in each plan year during the 4-year period ending with
the plan year is less than $1,000.
(C) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) Highly compensated employee.—The term "highly compensated
employee" has the meaning given such term by section 414(q).
(ii) Nonhighly compensated work force.—The term "nonhighly
compensated work force" means the aggregate number of individuals
(other than highly compensated employees)—
(I) who are employees of the recipient (without regard to this
subsection) and have performed services for the recipient (or for
the recipient and related persons) on a substantially full-time basis
for a period of at least 1 year, or
(II) who are leased employees with respect to the recipient
(determined without regard to this paragraph).
(iii) Compensation.—The term "compensation" has the same meaning as when used in section 415; except that such term shall include—
(I) any employer contribution under a qualified cash or deferred
arrangement to the extent not included in gross income under
section 402(a)(8) or 402(h)UXB),
(II) any amount which the employee would have received in cash
but for an election under a cafeteria plan (within the meaning of
section 125), and
(III) any amount contributed to an annuity contract described in
section 403(b) pursuant to a salary reduction agreement (within the
meaning of section 3121(aX5XD)).
(6) Other rules.—For purposes of this subsection—
(A) Related persons.—The term "related persons" has the same meaning
as when used in section 144(aX3).
(B) Employees of entities under common control.—The rules of subsections (b), (c), (m), and (o) shall apply.
(o) Regulations.—The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations (which may
provide rules in addition to the rules contained in subsections (m) and (n)) as may be
necessary to prevent the avoidance of any employee benefit requirement listed in
subsection (m)(4) or (n)(3) or any requirement under section 457 through the use of—
(1) separate organizations,
(2) employee leasing, or
(3) other arrangements.
The regulations prescribed under subsection (n) shall include provisions to minimize
the recordkeeping requirements of subsection (n) in the case of an employer which
has no top-heavy plans (within the meaning of section 416(g)) and which uses the
services of persons (other than employees) for an insignificant percentage of the
employer's total workload.
(p) Qualified domestic relations order defined.—For purposes of this subsection
and section 401(aX13>—
(1) In general.—
(A) Qualified domestic relations order.—The term "qualified domestic
relations order" means a domestic relations order—
(i) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's
right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a
100USCA—7
1991 PP.
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portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant undeiq
plan, and
(ii) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs (2) and
are met
(B) Domestic relations order.—The term "domestic relations ordej
means any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a proper!
settlement agreement) which—
(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments,
marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or oth«»
dependent of a participant, and
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including
community property law).
(2) Order must clearly specify certain facts.—A domestic relations order
meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order clearly specifies-jj
(A) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the particfi
pant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered ^
the order,
(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid Dy.
the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount
or percentage is to be determined,
(C) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and
(D) each plan to which such order applies.
(3) Order may not alter amount, form, etc., of benefits.—A domestic rela?
tions order meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order-3
(A) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any*
option, not otherwise provided under the plan,
(B) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on
the basis of actuarial value), and
(C) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which'
are required to be paid to another alternate payee under another order
previously determined to be a qualified domestic relations order.
(4) Exception for certain payments made after earliest retirement age.—
(A) In general.—A domestic relations order shall not be treated as failing
to meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) solely
because such order requires that payment of benefits be made to an
alternate payee—
(i) in the case of any payment before a participant has separated
from service, on or after the date on which the participant attains (or
would have attained) the earliest retirement age,
(ii) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such
payment is to begin under such order (but taking into account only the
present value of the benefits actually accrued and not taking into
account the present value of any employer subsidy for early retirement), and
(iii) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to
the participant (other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity
with respect to the alternate payee and his or her subsequent spouse).
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate assumption used in determining
the present value shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate
is specified, 5 percent
(B) Earliest retirement age.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"earliest retirement age" means the earlier of—
(i) the date on which the participant is entitled to a distribution under
the plan, or
(ii) the later of—
(I) the date the participant attains age 50, or
(II) the earliest date on which the participant could begin receiving benefits under the plan if the participant separated from
service.
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(5) Treatment of former spouse as surviving spouse for purposes of determining survivor benefits.—To the extent provided in any qualified domestic
relations order—
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving
spouse of such participant for purposes of sections 401(aXH) and 417 (and
any spouse of the participant shall not be treated as a spouse of the
participant for such purposes), and
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving former spouse shall be
treated as meeting the requirements of section 417(d).
(6) Plan procedures with respect to orders.—
(A) Notice and determination by administrator.—In the case of any
domestic relations order received by a plan—
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and
each alternate payee of the receipt of such order and the plan's
procedures for determining the qualified status of domestic relations
orders, and
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan
administrator shall determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order and notify the participant and each alternate payee of
such determination.
(B) Plan to establish reasonable procedures.—Each plan shall establish
reasonable procedures to determine the qualified status of domestic relations orders and to administer distributions under such qualified orders.
(7) Procedures for period during which determination is being made,—
(A) In general.—During any period in which the issue of whether a
domestic relations order is a qualified domestic relations order is being
determined (by the plan administrator, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or otherwise), the plan administrator shall separately account for the
amounts (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the "segregated
amounts") which would have been payable to the alternate payee during
such period if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic
relations order.
(B) Payment to alternate payee if order determined to be qualified
domestic relations order.—If within the 18-month period describe*! in
subparagraph (E) the order (or modification thereof) is determined to 'be a
qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay the
segregated amounts (including any interest thereon) to the person or
persons entitled thereto.
(C) Payment to plan participant in certain cases.—If within the
18-month period described in subparagraph (E)—
(i) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations
order, or
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic
relations order is not resolved,
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (including any
interest thereon) to the person or persons who would have been entitled to
such amounts if there had been no order.
(D) Subsequent determination or order to be applied prospectively
only.—Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations
order which is made after the close of the 18-month period described in
subparagraph (E) shall be applied prospectively only.
(E) Determination of 18-month period.—For purposes of this paragraph, the 18-month period described in this subparagraph is the 18-month
period beginning with the date on which the first payment would be
required to be made under the domestic relations order.
IS) Alternate payee defined.—The term "alternate payee" means any spouse,
former spouse, child or other dependent of a partidpant who is recognized by a
domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the
benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant
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(9) Subsection not to apply to plans to which section 401(a)(13) does noj
apply.—This subsection shall not apply to any plan to which section 401(aXlSJj
does not apply. For purposes of this title, except as provided in regulations, anj
distribution from an annuity contract under section 403(b) pursuant to a quali
fied domestic relations order shall be treated in the same manner as a distribit
tion from a plan to which section 401(a)(13) applies.
(10) Waiver of certain distribution requirements.—With respect to the requirements of subsections (a) and (k) of section 401, section 403(b), and section
409(d), a plan shall not be treated as failing to meet such requirements solely by
reason of payments to an alternative payee pursuant to a qualified domestic
relations order.
(11) Application of rules to governmental and church plans.—For purposes
of this title, a distribution or payment from a governmental plan (as defined in
subsection (d)) or a church plan (as described in subsection (e)) shall be treated
as made pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order if it is made pursuant
to a domestic relations order which meets the requirement of clause (i) of
paragraph (1)(A).
(12) Consultation with the Secretary.—In prescribing regulations under this
subsection and section 401(a){13), the Secretary of Labor shall consult with the
Secretary.
(q) Highly compensated employee.—
(1) In general.—The term "highly compensated employee" means any employee who, during the year or the preceding year—
(A) was at any time a 5-percent owner,
(B) received compensation from the employer in excess of $75,000,
(C) received compensation from the employer in excess of $50,000 and
was in the top-paid group of employees for such year, or
(D) was at any time an officer and received compensation greater than 50
percent of the amount in effect under section 415(bXl)(A) for such year.
The Secretary shall adjust the $75,000 and $50,000 amounts under this paragraph at the same time and in the same manner as under section 415(d).
(2) Special rule for current year.—In the case of the year for which the
relevant determination is being made, an employee not described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (1) for the preceding year (without regard to
this paragraph) shall not be treated as described in subparagraph (B), (Q, or (D)
of paragraph (1) unless such employee is a member of the group consisting of
the 100 employees paid the greatest compensation during the year for which
such determination is being made.
(3) 5-percent owner.—An employee shall be treated as a 5-percent owner for
any year if at any time during such year such employee was a 5-percent owner
(as defined in section 416(iXl)) of the employer.
(4) Top-paid group.—An employee is in the top-paid group of employees for
any year if such employee is in the group consisting of the top 20 percent of the
employees when ranked on the basis of compensation paid during such year.
(5) Special rules for treatment of officers.—
(A) Not more than 50 officers taken into account—For purposes of
paragraph (1XD), no more than 50 employees (or, if lesser, the greater of 3
employees or 10 percent of the employees) shall be treated as officers.
(B) At least 1 officer taken into account—If for any year no officer of
the employer is described in paragraph (1XD), the highest paid officer of the
employer for such year shall be treated as described in such paragraph.
(6) Treatment of certain family members.—
(A) In general.—If any individual is a member of the family of a
5-percent owner or of a highly compensated employee in the group consisting of the 10 highly compensated employees paid the greatest compensation
during the year, then—
(i) such individual shall not be considered a separate employee, and
(ii) any compensation paid to such individual (and any applicable
contribution or benefit on behalf of such individual) shall be treated as
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"(4) in the case of plans not subject to title I
or IV of such Act and having only 1 participant, a resolution terminating the plan was
adopted by the employer before October 1,
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**(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a qualified
pension plan and welfare benefit plan are described in this paragraph if—
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§ 4980A. Tax on excess distributions from qualified retirement plans
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§ 4980B. Failure to satisfy continuation coverage requirements of group health
plans
(a) General rule.—There is hereby imposed a tax on the failure of a group health
plan to meet the requirements of subsection (f) with respect to any qualified
beneficiary.
(b) Amount of tax.—
(1) In generaL—The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) on any
failure with respect to a qualified beneficiary shall be $100 for each day in the
noncompliance period with respect to sjjich failure. .
(2) Noncompliance period.—For purposes of this section, the term "noncompliance period" means, with respect to any failure, the period—
(A) beginning on the date such failure first occurs, and
(B) ending on the earlier of—
(i) the date such failure is corrected, or
(ii) the date which is 6 months after tne last day in the period
applicable to the qualified beneficiary under subsection (fX2XB) (determined without regard to clause (iii) thereof).
If a person is liable for tax under subsection (eXIXB) by reason of subsection (e)(2XB) with respect to any failure, the noncompliance period for such
person with respect to such failure shall not begin before the 45th day after
the written request described in subsection (e)(2)(B) is provided to such
person.
(3) Minimum tax for noncompliance period where failure discovered after
notice of examination.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(c)(A) In general.—In the case of 1 or more failures with respect to a
qualified beneficiary—
(i) which are not corrected before the date a notice of examination of
income tax liability is sent to the employer, and
(ii) which occurred or continued during the period under examination,
the amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) by reason of such failures with
respect to such beneficiary shall not be less than the lesser of $2,500 or the
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amount of tax which would be imposed by subsection (a) without regard to
such paragraphs.
(B) Higher minimum tax where violations are more than de minimis.
—To the extent violations by the employer (or the plan in the case of a
multiemployer plan) for any year are more than de minimis, subparagraph
(A) shall be applied by substituting "$15,000" for "$2,500" with respect to
the employer (or such plan).
(c) Limitations on amount of tax.—
(1) Tax not to apply where failure not discovered exercising reasonable
diligence.—No tax shall be imposed by subsection (a) on any failure during any
period for which it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that none of
the persons referred to in subsection (e) knew, or exercising reasonable diligence
would have known, that such failure existed.
(2) Tax not to apply to failures corrected within 30 days.—No tax shall be
imposed by subsection (a) on any failure if—
(A) such failure was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect,
and
(B) such failure is corrected during the 30-day period beginning on the
1st date any of the persons referred to in subsection (e) knew, or exercising
reasonable 'diligence would have known, that such failure existed..
(3) $100 limit on amount of tax for failures on any day with respect to a
qualified beneficiary.—
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the maximum
amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) on failures on any day during the
noncompliance period with respect to a qualified beneficiary shall be $100.
(B) Special rule where more than 1 qualified beneficiary.—If there is
more than 1 qualified beneficiary with respect to the same qualifying event,
the maximum amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) on all failures on any
day during the noncompliance period with respect to such qualified beneficiaries shall be $200.
(4) Overall limitation for unintentional failures.—In the case of failures
which are due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect—
(A) Single employer plans.—
(i) In general.—In the case of failures with respect to plans other
than multiemployer plans, the tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures
during the taxable year of the employer shall not exceed the amount
equal to the lesser of—
(I) 10 percent of the aggregate amount paid or incurred by the
employer (or predecessor employer) during the preceding taxable
year for group health plans, or
(II) $500,000.
(ii) Taxable years in the case of certain controlled groups.—For
purposes of this subparagraph, if not all persons who are treated as a
single employer for purposes of this section have the sarr^ taxable
year, the taxable years taken into account shall be detenr.ir-d .inder
principles similar to the principles of section 1561.
(B) Multiemployer plans.—
(i) In general.—In the case of failures with respect to a ir.u.t.errplover plan, the tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures during the
taxable year of the trust forming part of such plan shall ro: exceed the
amount equal to the lesser of—
(I) 10 percent of the amount paid or incurred by s-:h trust
during such taxable year to provide medical care <as Ccf.r.cd in
section 213(d)) directly or through insurance, reimburserr.enl, or
otherwise, or
(II) $500,000.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, all plans of which the same
trust forms a part shall be treated as 1 plan.
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(ii) Special rule for employers required to pay tax.—If an employer
is assessed a tax imposed by subsection (a) by reason of a failure with
respect to a multiemployer plan, the limit shall be determined under
subparagraph (A) (and not under this subparagraph) and as if such plan
were not a multiemployer plan.
(C) Special rule for persons providing benefits.—In the case of a person
described in subsection (eXl)(B) (and not subsection (eXl)(A)), the aggregate
amount of tax imposed by subsection (a) for failures during a taxable year
with respect to all plans shall not exceed $2,000,000.
(5) Waiver by secretary.—In the case of a failure which is due to reasonable
cause and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may waive part or all of the tax
imposed by subsection (a) to the extent that the payment of such tax would be
excessive relative to the failure involved.
(d) Tax not to apply to certain plans.—This section shall not apply to—
(1) any failure of a group health plan to meet the requirements of subsection
(f) with respect to any qualified beneficiary if the qualifying event with respect
to such beneficiary occurred during the calendar year immediately following a
calendar year during which all employers maintaining such plan normally
employed fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day.
(2) any governmental plan (within the meaning of section 414(d)), or
(3) any church plan (within the meaning of section 414(e)).
(e) Liability for tax.—
(1) In general.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the following shall be liable for the tax imposed by subsection (a) on a failure:
(A)(i) In the case of a plan other than a multiemployer plan, the employer.
(ii) In the case of a multiemployer plan, the plan.
(B) Each person who is responsible (other than in a capacity as an
employee) for administering or providing benefits under the plan and whose
act or failure to act caused (in whole or in part) the failure.
2) Special rules for persons described in paragraph (1)(B).—
(A) No liability unless written agreement.—Except in tjie case of liability resulting from the application of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, a
person described in subparagraph (B) (and not in subparagraph (A)) of
paragraph (1) shall be liable for the ^ax imposed by subsection (a) on any
failure only if such person assumed (under a legally enforceable written
agreement) responsibility for the performance of the act to which the
failure relates.
(B) Failure to cover qualified beneficiaries where current employees
are covered.—A person shall be treated as described in paragraph (1KB)
with respect to a qualified beneficiary if—
(i) such person provides coverage under a group health plan for an\
similarly situated beneficiary under the plan with respect to \*hom a
qualifying event has not occurred, and
(ii) the—
(I) employer or plan administrator, or
(II) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph
(C) or (E) of subsection (f)(3) where the person described in clause
(i) is the plan administrator, the qualified beneficiary,
submits to such person a written request that such person ira?e
available to such qualified beneficiary the same coverage which such
person provides to the beneficiary referred to in clause U<
(f) Continuation coverage requirements of group health plans.—
(1) In general.—A group health plan meets the requirements of this subsection only if each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as
a result of a qualifying event is entitled to elect, within the election period,
continuation coverage under the plan.
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(2) Continuation coverage.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "continuation coverage" means coverage under the plan which meets the following
requirements:
(A) Type of benefit coverage.—The coverage must consist of coverage
which, as of the time the coverage is being provided, is identical to the
coverage provided under the plan to similarly situated beneficiaries under
the plan with respect to whom a qualifying event has not occurred. If
coverage under the plan is modified for any group of similarly situated
beneficiaries, the coverage shall also be modified in the same manner for all
individuals who are qualified beneficiaries under the plan pursuant to this
subsection in connection with such group.
(B) Period of coverage.—The coverage must extend for at least the
period beginning on the date of the qualifying event and ending not earlier
than the earliest of the following:
(i) Maximum required period.—
(I) General rule for terminations and reduced hours.—In the
case of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3KB), except as
provided in subclause (II), the date which is 18 months after the
date of the qualifying event
(II) Special rule for multiple qualifying events.—If a qualifying event (other than a qualifying event described in paragraph
(3XF)) occurs during the 18 months after the date of a qualifying
event described in paragraph (3)(B), the date which is 36 months
after the date of the qualifying event described in paragraph (3)(B).
(III) Special rule for certain bankruptcy proceedings.—In the
case of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3)(F) (relating to
bankruptcy proceedings), the date of the death of the covered
employee or qualified beneficiary (described in subsection
(g)(lXD)(iii)), or in the case of the surviving spouse or dependent
children of the coveraged employee, 36 months after the date of the
death of the covered employee.
(IV) General rule for other qualifying events.—In the case of a
qualifying event not described in paragraph (3)(B) or (3)(F), the date
which is 36 months after the date of the qualifying event. In the
case of a qualified beneficiary who is determined, under title II or
XVI of the Social Security Act, to have been disabled at the time of
a qualifying event described in paragraph (3XB), any reference in
subclause (I) or (II) to 18 months with respect to such event is
deemed a reference to 29 months, but only if the qualified beneficiary has provided notice of such determination under paragraph
(6XC) before the end of such 18 months.
(V) Qualifying event involving medicare entitlement—In the
case of an event described in paragraph (3)(D) (without regard to
whether such event is a qualifying event), the period of coverage
for qualified beneficiaries other than the covered employee for such
event or any subsequent qualifying event shall not terminate
before the close of the 36-month period beginning on the date the
covered employee becomes entitled to benefits under title XVIII of
the Social Security Act
(ii) End of plan.—The date on which the employer ceases to provide
any group health plan to any employee.
(iii) Failure to pay premium.—The date on which coverage ceases
under the plan by reason of a failure to make timely payment of any
premium required under the plan writh respect to the qualified beneficiary. The payment of any premium (other than any payment referred
to in the last sentence of subparagraph (C)) shall be considered to be
timely if made within 30 days after the date due or within such longer
period as applies to or under the plan.
(iv) Group health plan coverage or Medicare entitlement—The
date on which the qualified beneficiary' first becomes, after the date of
the election—
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(I) covered under any other group health plan (as an employee
or otherwise) which does not contain any exclusion or limitation
•with respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary, or
(II) in the case of a qualified beneficiary other than a qualified
beneficiary described in subsection (gXIXD) entitled to benefits
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
(v) Termination of extended coverage for disability.—In the case of
a qualified beneficiary who is disabled at the time of a qualifying event
described in paragraph (3)(B), the month that begins more than 30 days
after the date of the final determination under title II or XVI of the
Social Security Act that the qualified beneficiary is no longer disabled.
(C) Premium requirements.—The plan may require payment of a premium for any period of continuation coverage, except that such premium—
(i) shall not exceed 102 percent of the applicable premium for such
period, and
(ii) may, at the election of the payor, be made in monthly installments. In no event may the plan require the payment of any premium
before the day which is 45 days after the day on which the qualified
beneficiary made the initial election for continuation coverage. In the
case of an individual described in the last sentence of subparagraph
(B)(i), any reference in clause (i) of this subparagraph to "102 percent"
is deemed a reference to "150 percent" for any month after the 18th
month of continuation coverage described in subclause (I) or (II) of
subparagraph (B)(i).
(D) No requirement of insurability.—The coverage may not be conditioned upon, or discriminate on the basis of lack of, evidence of insurability.
(E) Conversion option.—In the case of a qualified beneficiary whose
period of continuation coverage expires under subparagraph (B)(i), the plan
must, during the 180-day period ending on such expiration date, provide to
the qualified beneficiary the option of enrollment under a conversion health
plan otherwise generally available under the plan.
(3) Qualifying event—For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualifying
event" means, with respect to any covered employee, any of the following
events which, but for the continuation coverage required under this subsection,
would result in the loss of coverage of a qualified beneficiary—
(A) The death of the covered employee.
(B) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross
misconduct), or reduction of hours, of the covered employee's employment
(C) The divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the
employee's spouse.
(D) The covered employee becoming entitled to benefits under title XVIII
of the Social Security Act
(E) A dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the generally
applicable requirements of the plan.
(F) A proceeding in a case under title 11, United States Gode, commencing on or after July 1, 1986, with respect to the employer frum whose
- employment the covered employee retired at any time.
In the case of an event described in subparagraph (F), a loss of coverage
includes a substantial elimination of coverage with respect to a qualified
beneficiary described in subsection (gXl)(D) within one year before or after the
date of commencement of the proceeding.
(4) Applicable premium.—For purposes of this subsection—
(A) In general.—The term "applicable premium" means, with respect to
any period of continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries, the cost to
the plan for such period of the coverage for similarly situated beneficiaries
v, ith respect to whom a qualifying event has not occurred (without regard
to whether such cost is paid by the employer or employee).
(B) Special rule for self-insured plans.—To the extent that a plan is a
self-insured plan—
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(i) In general.—Except as provided in clause (ii), the applicable
premium for any period of continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries shall be equal to a reasonable estimate of the cost of providing
coverage for such period for similarly situated beneficiaries which—
(I) is determined on an actuarial basis, and
(II) takes into account such factors as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations.
(ii) Determination on basis of past cost—If a plan administrator
elects to have this clause apply, the applicable premium for any period
of continuation coverage of qualified beneficiaries shall be equal to—
(I) the cost to the plan for similarly situated beneficiaries for the
same period occurring during the preceding determination period
under subparagraph (C), adjusted by
(II) the percentage increase or decrease in the implicit price
deflator of the gross national product (calculated by the Department of Commerce and published in the Survey of Current Business) for the 12-month period ending on the last day of the sixth
month of such preceding determination period.
(iii) Clause (ii) not to apply where significant change.—A plan
administrator may not elect to have clause (ii) apply in any case in
which there is any significant difference between the determination
period and the preceding determination period, in coverage under, or in
employees covered by, the plan. The determination under the preceding sentence for any determination period shall be made at the same
time as the determination under subparagraph (C).
(C) Determination period.—The determination of any applicable premium shall be made for a period of 12 months and shall be made before the
beginning of such period.
(5) Election.—For purposes of this subsection—
(A) Election period.—The term "election period" means the period
v. hich—
(i) begins not later than the date on which coverage terminates
under the plan by reason of a qualifying event,
(ii) is of at least 60 days' duration, and
(iii) ends not earlier than 60 days after the later of—
(I) the date described in clause (i), or
(II) in the case of any qualified beneficiary who receives notice
under paragraph (6XD), the date of such notice.
(B) Effect of election on other beneficiaries.—Except as otherwise
specified in an election, any election of continuation coverage by a qualified
beneficiary described in subparagraph (AXi) or (B) of subsection (gXl) shall
be deemed to include an election of continuation coverage on behalf of any
other qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan by
reason of the qualifying event If there is a choice among types of
co\erage under the plan, each qualified beneficiary is entitled to make a
separate selection among such types of coverage.
(6) Notice requirement—In accordance with regulations prescnbed by the
Secretary—
(A) The group health plan shall provide, at the time of commencement of
coverage under the plan, written notice to each covered employee and
spouse of the employee (if any) of the rights provided under this subsection.
(B) The employer of an employee under a plan must notify the plan
administrator of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (A), (B), (D),
or (F) of paragraph (3) with respect to such employee within 30 days (or, in
the case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such longer
period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of the date of
the qualifying event
(C) Each covered employee or qualified beneficiary is responsible for
notifying the plan administrator of the occurrence of any qualifying event
described in subparagraph (C) or (E) of paragraph (3) within 60 days after
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the date of the qualifying event and each qualified beneficiary who is
determined, under title II or XVI of the Social Security Act, to have been
disabled at the time of a qualifying event described in paragraph (3KB) is
responsible for notifying the plan administrator of such determination
within 60 days after the date of the determination and for notifying the plan
administrator within 30 days of the date of any final determination under
such title or titles that the qualified beneficiary is no longer disabled.
(D) The plan administrator shall notify—
(i) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (A),
(B), (D), or (F) of paragraph (3), any qualified beneficiary with respect
to such event, and
(ii) in the case of a qualifying event described in subparagraph (C) or
(E) of paragraph (3) where the covered employee notifies the plan
administrator under subparagraph (C), any qualified beneficiary with
respect to such event,
of such beneficiary's rights under this subsection.
For purposes of subparagraph (D), any notification shall be made within 14
days (or, in the case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan,
such longer period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of
the date on which the plan administrator is notified under subparagraph (B)
or (C), whichever is applicable, and any such notification to an individual
who is a qualified beneficiary as the spouse of the covered employee shall
be treated as notification to all other qualified beneficiaries residing with
such spouse at the time such notification is made. For purposes of
subparagraph (D), any notification shall be made within 14 days (or, in the
case of a group health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such longer
period of time as may be provided in the terms of the plan) of the date on
which the plan administrator is notified under subparagraph (B) or (C),
whichever is applicable, and any such notification to an individual who is a
qualified beneficiary as the spouse of the covered employee shall be treated
as notification to all other qualified beneficiaries residing with such spouse
at the time such notification is made.
The requirements of subparagraph (B) shall be'considered satisfied in the
case of a multiemployer plan in connection with a qualifying event described
in paragraph (3)(B) if the plan provides that the determination, of the
occurrence of such qualifying event will be made by the plan administrator.
(7) Covered employee.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "covered
employee" means an individual who is (or was) provided coverage under a group
health plan by virtue of the performance of services by the individual for 1 or
more persons maintaining the plan (including as an employee defined in section
401(c)(1)).
(8) Optional extension of required periods.—A group health plan shall not
be treated as failing to meet the requirements of this subsection solely because
the plan provides both—
(A) that the period of extended co\erage referred to m paragraph (2KB)
commences with the date of the loss of coverage, and
(B) that the applicable notice period provided under paragraph (6KB)
commences with the date of the loss of coverage.
(g) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
(1) Qualified beneficiary.—
(A) In general.—The term "qualified beneficiary" means, v»ith respect to
a covered employee under a group health plan, any other individual who, on
the day before the qualifying event for that emplojee, is a beneficiary
under the plan—
(i) as the spouse of the covered employee, or
(ii) as the dependent child of the employee
(B) Special rule for terminations and reduced employment—In the
case of a qualifying event described in subsection (fK3)(B), the term "qualified beneficiary" includes the covered -employee.
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(C) Exception for nonresident aliens.—Notwithstanding subparagraphs
(A) and (B), the term "qualified beneficiary" does not include an individual
whose status as a covered employee is attributable to a period in which such
individual was a nonresident alien who received no earned income (within
the meaning of section 911(dX2)) from the employer which constituted
income from sources within the United States (within the meaning of section
861(a)(3)). If an individual is not a qualified beneficiary pursuant to the
previous sentence, a spouse or dependent child of such individual shall not
be considered a qualified beneficiary by virtue of the relationship of the
individual.
(D) Special rule for retirees and widows.—In the case of a qualifying
event described in subsection (f)(3)(F), the term "qualified beneficiary"
includes a covered employee who had retired on or before the date of
substantial elimination of coverage and any other individual who, on the day
before such qualifying event, is a beneficiary under the plan—
(i) as the spouse of the covered employee,
(ii) as the dependent child of the covered employee, or
(iii) as the surviving spouse of the covered employee.
(2) Group health plan.—The term "group health plan" has the meaning
given such term by section 5000(b)(1).
(3) Plan administrator.—The term "plan administrator" has the meaning
given the term "administrator" by section 3(16)(A) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974.
(4) Correction.—A failure of a group health plan to meet the requirements of
subsection (f) with respect to any qualified beneficiary shall be treated as
corrected if—
(A) such failure is retroactively undone to the extent possible, and
(B) the qualified beneficiary is placed in a financial position which is as
good as such beneficiary would have been in had such failure not occurred.
For purposes of applying subparagraph (B), the qualified beneficiary shall be
treated as if he had elected the most favorable coverage in light of the expenses
he incurred since the failure first occurred.
(Pub.L. 100-647, Title III, § 3011(a), Nov. lo, 1988,102 S t a t 3616, amended Pub.L. 101-239, Title
VI, §§ 6202(bX3XB), 6701(a), (b), (c), Titlejvil §§ 7862(cX2XB), (3XQ, (4XB),(5XA), 7891(dXlXB),
(2XA), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 S t a t 2233, 2234, 2295, 2432, 2433, 2446; Pub.L. 101-508, Title XI,
§ 11702(f), Nov, 5, 1990, 104 S t a t 1388-515.)
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7862(cX3XQ(0. «n cl (iv) heading, substituted
"or Medicare entitlement" for "or Medicare e!igibtlity"
(0(2XBXivXI)
Pub L. 101-239,
Subscc>
$ 7862(cX3XCX»0. inserted "*hich does not contain any exclusion or limitation *.ith respect to
preexisting condition of such beneficiary"
p k i
in, rxo
' £
JUVBV x
Pub L
10! 239
, ? l ^ f _ W**?*0, ,
~ '
670l
(aX2), added cl (v)
§
Subsec (fX2XQ Pub.L. 101-239, § 6701(b),
inserted "In the case of an individual described in
the last sentence of subparagraph (BX0, any referc n c c i n claU5C
<0 o f t h « subparagraph to '102
P*"*" 1 ' , s d c c m c d a reference to '150 percent' for
an
y m o n t n aft" l n * l^th month of continuation
coverage described in subclause (I) or (10 of
subparagraph (B)(i) "
Pub L. 101-239, § 7W2(Q(4XB)t substituted
"In no event may the plan require the payment of
any premium before the day wtiich is 45 days after
§
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the day on which the qualified beneficiary made
the initial election for continuation coverage." for
"If an election is made after the qualifying event,
the plan shall permit payment for continuation
coverage during the period preceding the election
to be made within 45 davs of the date of the
election "
Subsec (0(6) First sent foil (D) Tub L
101-239, § 7891(dXlXBX»). a<^ed flush sentence
relating to satisfaction of subpar (B) require
ments.
Subsec (0(6) Second sent foil (D) Pub L
101-239, § 7891(dXlXBX»XH), inserted in flush
sentence relating to notification after * 14 days"
the parenthetical text "(or, in the case of a group
health plan which is a multiemployer plan such
longer period of time as ma) be provided in the
terms of the plan)"

this section) shall apply to plan years beginning on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act
[Dec 19, 1989], regardless of whether the qualifymg event occurred before, on, or after such date.**
Section 7862(cX2XQ of P u b L 101-239 provided that "The amendments made by this paragraph [amending subsec (0(7) of this section and
section 1167(2) of Title 29] shall apply to plan
years beginning after December 31, 1989 "
Amendment by section 7862(cX3XQ of Pub L
101-239 amending subsec (0(4XBX'V) applicable
to qualifying events occurring after Dec 31, 1989,
and in the case of qualified beneficiaries, who
elected continuation coverage after Dec 31, 1988,
the period for which the required premium uas
paid, or was attempted to be paid but was rejected
as such, see section 7862(cX3XD) of P u b L
101-239, set out as a note under section 162 of
this title.

101-239,
Subsec
(0(6XB) Pub L
§ 7891(dXlXBX»XI), inserted after "30 davs" the
parenthetical text "(or, in the case of a group
health plan which is a multiemployer plan, such
longer penod of time as ma> be provided in the
terms of the plan)"

Section 7862(cX4XQ of Pub L 100-239 provided that ' The amendments made by this paragraph [amending subsec ( 0 ( 2 X 0 of this section
and section 1162 of Title 29] shall apply to plan
years beginning after December 31, 1989"

Subsec (0(6XQ PubL 101-239, § 6701(c),
added material requinng notification of plan ad
mintstrator within 60 days of date of determination of disability and within 30 days of date of
final determination that qualified beneficiary is no
longer disabled

Section 7862(cX5XQ of Pub L 101-239 provided that ' The amendments made by this paragraph [enacting subsec (0(2X8X1)00 of this section and section U62(2XAXv) of Title 29, Ubor]
shall apply to plan years beginning after December 31. 1989"

Subsec
(0(7) P u b L
101-239,
§ 7862(cX2XB), substituted "the performance of
serMces by the individual for 1 or more persons
maintaining the plan (including as an employee
defined in section 401(cX0) for the individual's
employment or previous employment with an em
ployer"

Section 7891(dXlXQ of PubL 101-239 provided that "The amendments made b> this para
graph [amending subsec (0(6) of this section]
shall apply with respect to plan years beginning
on or after January 1, 1990"

(0(8) P u b L
Subsec
§ 7891(dX2XA), added par (8)

101-239,

EffectiTe Dates
1990 Act Amendment by section U702 c(
Pub,U;JO 1-508 effective as tf included in the
provision of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 [Pub L, 100-647] to which such
amendment relates, sec section 11702(j) of P u b L
101-508, set out as a note under section 59 of this
title.'

Section 7891(dX2XQ of P u b L 101-239 provided that "The amendments made by this paragraph [enacting subsec (0(8) of this section and
amending section 1167 of Title 29] shall apply
with respect to plan years beginning on or after
January J, 1990,"

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Excise taxes on acts or transactions in connection with pension of other employee benefit plans,
see Internal Revenue <S=»4290 to 4298*

1989 A c t Amendment to subsec (gX2) of this
section by section 6202(bX3)(B) of P u b L
101-239 to apply to items and services furnished
after Dec 19, 1989, see section 6202(b)^5) of
Pub L 101-239, set out as a note under section
162 of this title.

Encyclopedias
Excise taxes on acts or transactions in connection with pension or other employee benefit plans,
see CJS. Internal Revenue §§ 143(1), 279, 280,
285, 1021.

Section 6701(d) pf PubL 101-239 provided
that *The amendments made by this section
[amending subsec (0(2)(BXD. (v), and (6XQ of

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Internal revenue cases 220k[add key number]

CHAPTER 44—QUALIFIED INVESTMENT ENTITIES
§ 4704. Excise tax on undistributed income of regulated investment companies
(a) Imposition of tax.—There is hereby imposed a tax on every regulated
investment company for each calendar year equal to 4 percent of the excess (if any)
of—
(1) therequireddistribution for such calendar year, over
(2) the distributed amount for such calendar year.
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30-3-5

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay (
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, cbr-109r§ M CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2), designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted I n determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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